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Globalization and the Privatization of
Welfare Administration in Indiana
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.*
ABSTRACT
This article explores the relationship of globalization to domestic law
in the context of privatized welfare services in Indiana. It examines the
ways that privatization can affect vulnerable populations such as welfare
recipients by, in effect, partially dis-embedding the market from the
state. It applies Karl Polanyi's conception of a double movement to
illustrate how the political process can, in effect, re-embed the market in
the state. Utilizing Indiana's recent experiences with welfare
administration privatization, this article shows that re-embedding is not
a simple question of reversing decisions already taken, but rather a
complex sequencing of political and legal engagements. It recommends
law reforms aimed at more easily triggering the kinds of political actions
anticipated by Polanyi's analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the relationship between globalization and law
requires analysis of the interactions of markets and law at all levels,
domestic and international, as well as diverse processes of norm
creation, enforcement, and adjudication by state and nonstate actors
alike. Complex sociopolitical interrelationships and interlegalities result
from these interactions. Domestic law is one effect of globalization, and
conversely, our conceptions of globalization are also (in part) effects of
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domestic law.' This article will focus on these recursive effects through
a case study involving the interplay of domestic law in relation to the
denationalizing forces of globalization in the highly domestic context of
social services.
Understanding the role of domestic law in the current global
environment involves two main perspectives. The first is a domestic
perspective on globalization, so as to appreciate the extent to which
globalization is produced and experienced in highly diverse ways in
different times, places, and circumstances. Taking a domestic
perspective on globalization reminds us that globalization is neither
uniform nor somehow "above" society and its institutions; it does not
erase or mitigate the specificity of local contexts and concerns. Thus,
globalization enlarges the scope for comparison at the same time that it
requires us to take into account the specifics of localized differences, as
these are also meaningful.
The second perspective is closely related to the first: understanding
domestic law's role today also means taking a global perspective on
domestic affairs. This goes beyond the interplay of the local and
translocal just described. "Global forces" are not only or wholly the
effects of extraterritorial or translocal (transnational) phenomena. They
do not necessarily come from beyond national borders or beyond
national governments. On the contrary, globalization is deeply
embedded within domestic institutions and their participants-both
public and private-as ideas, relations, interests, and effects. This
situation poses both opportunities and constraints on the relevance of
law and the potential for law reform, especially as affecting vulnerable
populations. As we shall see, globalization is not just a top down affair.
I. DOUBLE PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARKETIZATION OF SOCIAL SERVICES
To illustrate the importance of these perspectives to discussions of
law reform, this article will focus primarily on the privatization of
welfare administration through one "extended case" involving the state
of Indiana. 2 I chose this case because it illustrates so vividly both
perspectives described above as well as the potential for law reform
arising from what Karl Polanyi calls "the double movement" between
1. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION
THROUGH LAW REFORM 124-27 (2004).
2. See generally J. Van Velsen, The Extended-Case Method and Situational Analysis,
in THE CRAFT OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 129-49 (A. L. Epstein ed., 1967) (explaining the
use of the "extended case" method).
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the state and the market.3 In his classic book, The Great
Transformation, Polanyi argues that the self-regulating market is a
utopian myth that tends to normalize the dominance of market forces. 4
To this we might add the observation that the myth of the
self-regulating market tends to limit the political questions in
marketization to the value of efficiency. This was the case for certain
categories of vulnerable populations in the United States. The emphasis
on costs and efficiency in the context of privatized welfare services,
privatized prisons, and the administration of unregistered immigrants
obviates, to a great degree, many of the political, social, and ethical
issues that these social contexts might otherwise involve. 5 This situation
might, at least theoretically, in Polanyi's terms, trigger what he refers
to as a "double movement"-a sharp political reaction in the form of new
demands upon the state on behalf of those whose issues go beyond
efficiency and cost;6 however, in the United States, these groups have so
little political power that their needs do not usually rise to the level of a
public contest. Indeed, the existence of persistent poverty is often
assumed to be a function of the global marketplace working normally-
i.e. efficiently, with maximum reduction of fixed cost points. A market-
based model of globalization underlies these domestic reforms.
Polanyi anticipates that marketization would produce political
conditions that would result in the reversal of the processes that (in his
term) "dis-embed" the state from the market.7 The case this article
explores shows that re-embedding the state is not a simple question of
reversing decisions taken, but rather a complex sequencing of political
and legal engagements. We shall return to Polanyi later in the
discussion.8
As background to the case, I note that in the United States, the
marketization of social services became politically popular as electorates
became newly aware of global economic competition in the 1980s and
1990s, resulting in a major transformation in both the idea of "the
public" and the way the public sector functions in American life. 9
3. See KARL POLANYi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 79-80 (2d ed., Beacon Press 2001) (1944).
4. See id. at 71.
5. See AMAN, supra note 1, at 7. See also Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks:
The Case of Prisons, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 128-30 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
6. See POLANYI, supra note 3, at 79-80.
7. Id. at xxvi, 74.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See AMAN, supra note 1 at 124-27. See also DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
NEOLIBERALISM 74-86 (2005) [hereinafter NEOLIBERALISM]. See generally GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow
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Understanding the domestic faces of globalization-represented in this
article primarily by welfare recipients-requires both of these
perspectives. But welfare is not the only context that is instructive in
this regard. Immigration and privatized prisons offer other relevant
cases (though beyond the scope of this article). For example, in the
context of immigration, a global perspective on domestic affairs draws
our attention to the factors affecting migrants' choices regarding
destination, the decision to migrate in the first place, and the question
of admission to the new host country. But it does not stop there. A
domestic perspective on globalization reminds us that admission is not
the same as inclusion. In the United States, some of the problems facing
immigrants are also the problems of the working poor and other
populations at the social margins who are particularly affected by
reductions in social services.10 Thus, welfare eligibility in many states
increasingly depends upon judgments rendered by private companies."
Prisoners held in privately managed facilities are also subject to
companies' business interests and their need to satisfy their
shareholders.12 Political debates that connect globalization to
government regulation, especially outsourcing and privatization,
usually treat globalization as if it were synonymous with the market,
often politically packaged with (or as) ideological assertions about the
virtues of markets over bureaucracy. The issue of immigration is
intertwined with these premises in several ways. The regulation of
immigration tends to privilege work, particularly skilled work; under
other circumstances, the argument against migration is waged on the
grounds of unfair (i.e., under-selling) competition for jobs with the
native born. Immigration policy sets heavy bars against migrants who
might require government-subsidized social services. 13 These are
essentially efficiency arguments entirely consistent with marketized
eds., 2009) (describing the shift of federal and state government to work with private
organizations since the New Deal era); DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE
CRISES OF CAPITALISM (2010).
10. See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Graham Rehrig, The Domestic Face of
Globalization: Law's Role in the Integration of Immigrants in the United States (2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945825; THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLITICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
(Judith Goode & Jeff Maskovsky eds., 2001); LOIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (Duke Univ. Press, English Language
ed. 2009).
11. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 83.
12. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New
Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1711 (2002); Shymeka L. Hunter, More Than
Just a Private Affair: Is The Practice of Incarcerating Alaska Prisoners in Private
Out-Of-State Prisons Unconstitutional?, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 319, 328-29 (2000).
13. Aman & Rehrig, supra note 10, at 4.
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approaches to other areas of social policy. But immigration also
challenges those approaches. Anti-immigration critics blame
immigrants for restricting the work opportunities of the native born, but
not the policies that produce job scarcity. They blame immigrants for
working, but also for not working.
A similar story can be told for prisoners, especially those held in
private prisons. 14 A domestic perspective on globalization shows states
eager to compete in the global economy by attracting new investment
and jobs to their jurisdictions. To engage in this competition, they often
use as their political currency the promise of low taxes, a skilled
workforce, and low regulatory costs-including off-loading the costs of
maintaining and managing prisons. 15 Such global aspirations have
coincided with an explosion of population growth in prisons due largely
to drug laws and approaches to punishment embodied by so-called three
strike laws.1 6 One way to build new prisons and not raise taxes is to
outsource the construction and management of these prisons to private
firms. 17 Private firms pay the upfront construction costs and amortize
them over a number of years; new prisons can be built without
significantly affecting state taxes or budgets.18 Private firms usually cut
14. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 233-39 (2011); Dolovich, supra note 5
(arguing that comparative efficiency in the realm of outsourcing government operations
serves as a rhetorical device that excludes some concerns altogether and reframes others
in ways inconsistent with its own priorities); Anne Larason Schneider, Public-Private
Partnerships in the U.S. Prison System, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 199
(Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000).
15. See Dolovich, supra note 5, at 139. See also Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L.
REV. 879, 929 (2004) (summarizing the pro-privatization and cost efficiency argument for
state prison systems).
16. See HARCOURT, supra note 14, at 202. These and other approaches have led to an
explosion of prison populations around the U. S. and various new means for managing
these prisoners as well as building and financing the new prisons now required to hold
them. See id. at 196-208. Indeed, as Bernard Harcourt has pointed out, "In 2008, the
United States ... incarcerated more than one percent of its adult population-the highest
rate in the world, five times the rate in England and twelve times the rate in Japan, and
the highest raw number in the world as well." Id. at 198. And more than 10% of African
American men between the ages of 20-34 were behind bars. Id.
17. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative
Law, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra
note 5, at 261, 274-75; Dolovich, supra note 5, at 142-43.
18. See generally Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM.
U. L. REV. 531, 625-35 (1989) (discussing a variety of ways in which government agencies
contract for private financing for the construction and operation of new correctional
facilities).
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costs in other ways, as well-for example, by employing nonunion
guards, who are paid nonunion wages and hired in lower numbers. 19
A global perspective on domestic law shows that the firms to which
this work is outsourced are, in most instances, multinational
corporations that operate private prisons around the world.20 Moreover,
though the theory behind outsourcing is that a state can thereby take
advantage of market competition and get the best price, there are often
only a few firms that regularly compete for such contracts, dominating
the field. 21 A kind of delegation occurs not just to the private sector
generally, but more specifically to a handful of firms. A global
perspective reveals that outsourcing often means trading a government
monopoly for a private one or at least a private oligopoly. The expertise
that these firms develop internationally in such public-private
management arrangements can create its own pressures for
privatization at the international level. 22 Welfare policy also involves
parallels to the economic logic behind privatized prisons as well as to
immigration, referenced above. At the federal level, for example, the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 eliminated welfare assistance to
immigrants;23 the provisions excluding immigrants from welfare
19. Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 359, 383-84 (1996).
20. The GEO Group, Inc. employs over 18,000 employees and operates andlor owns
over one hundred facilities on several continents. Locations, GEO,
http://www.geogroup.comllocations (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA) operates within the United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. About Us, CCA, http://www.cca.com/aboutl (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). See
generally Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison
Industrial Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 589, 601-03 (2012).
21. Stephen Raher, The Business of Punishing: Impediments to Accountability in the
Private Corrections Industry, 13 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 209, 214 (2010); Ahmed A. White,
Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential
Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 134 (2001).
22. For example, many developing nations are now contracting water services to large
transnational corporations. See Kristin L. Retherford, Note, Regulating the Corporate Tap:
Applying Global Administrative Law Principles to Achieve the Human Right to Water, 88
IND. L.J. (forthcoming Fall 2013) (manuscript at 10, 13-17) (on file with the author)
(discussing privatization of water services in Bolivia and Indonesia). These firms have
placed pressure on the World Trade Organization to liberalize the water market in
developing nations, which would effectively commodify water. See Rona Nardone, Note,
Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World's Water Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 183,
195-97 (2003). See generally Bryant Walker Smith, Water As A Public Good: The Status of
Water Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
291 (2009) (discussing whether water is a "product" subject to the WTO's General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)).
23. Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (2012)).
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amounted to a significant portion of the cost savings usually attributed
to that Act. 24
These and other market driven reforms are in many ways a
response to a particular conception of globalization as economic pressure
resulting from global economic competition. 25 They are in part attempts
by states to be as competitive as possible in their drive to attract new
capital to their state as well as retain the investments already there.
The reforms are also the culmination of experiments occurring
throughout the country, experiments that place more and more faith in
markets and private providers than in traditional public sector
employees and facilities. 26 Privatization of social services, which in this
context means the outsourcing of the administration of social services to
private entities, is the primary zone where we can expect to find an
active exchange between global and domestic perspectives. Specifically,
the new relationships between private and public actors created by the
marketization of borders, prisons, and welfare, teach us important
lessons about the domestic fronts of globalization and-in that light-
we may see the potential for new kinds of law reform that can correct
the limitations of a binary conception of government and markets as if
these were mutually exclusive. A role for law reform exists, particularly
law reform that can help create new forums for deliberation and
stakeholder participation when it comes to decisions regarding whether
and how to outsource. Creating new opportunities for political
participation would be in keeping with the idea of Polanyi's "double
movement."27
Looking ahead to those future developments, it bears noting that
there are other models of globalization beyond the neoliberal one that
predominates today. 28 If we are, in Polanyi's terms, to re-embed these
market means into society, law has an important role to play in creating
24. See generally Alex Stepick, There Is More to Life Than a Glass of Water:
Immigration in the Contemporary United States, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 392 (2006).
25. See NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 64-89; AMAN, supra note 1, at 34-35.
26. However, as Henry Giroux has written, "market-driven utopias... have implored
us to turn away from the public realm as a terrain for improvement and change, to cut our
losses there and limit our involvements, and to instead encourage individual
responsibility, personal initiative, and the central-ity of people's private activities. Our
social order . . . may not be perfect but it is good enough." HENRY A. GIROUX, PUBLIC
SPACES, PRIVATE LIVES: DEMOCRACY BEYOND 9/11, 113 (2003). See also Alfred C. Aman,
Jr., Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal State, 51 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 801, 806 (2007) (arguing that a global perspective on these domestic reforms,
along with a domestic perspective on their global implications will help us understand
such trends and their limits).
27. See POLANYI, supra note 3, at 79-80.
28. See, e.g., Peter Evans, Is an Alternative Globalization Possible?, 36 POL. & SOC'Y
271 (2008).
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opportunities for stakeholders to go beyond narrow cost questions and to
pragmatically and flexibly experiment with approaches that offer fresh
solutions to the need for efficient and fair outcomes. Law can provide
the mechanisms and the forums for working out the negotiation of
public and private interests in the political arena.29 Understanding how
market means affect the substantive provisions of the programs they
are designed to deliver requires a different way of thinking about
globalization. In relation to social services, it requires a translation and
an appreciation of the actual effects of the market in action on the
substantive goals of the social services program involved. 30 If, for
29. See generally AMAN, supra note 1; GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 9.
30. See Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wis. L. REV.
335 (2005). The "New Legal Realism" is an emerging approach to law that attempts to
incorporate interdisciplinary studies and empirical analysis into legal policy
considerations. As Professor Erlanger states, "[]ike the original Realists, who also sought
to use social science in service of advancing legal knowledge, new legal realist scholars
bring together legal theory and empirical research to build a stronger foundation for
understanding law and formulating legal policy." Id. at 337. The New Legal Realists
emphasize a "Bottom-Up" approach to empirical study:
The concept of "bottom-up" legal scholarship captures a combination of
important aspects of NLR's [New Legal Realism] approach to research.
First, at a methodological level, a bottom-up approach requires that
assertions about the impact of law be supported by research at the
"ground" level. This in turn requires that we rely on (or actually
undertake ourselves) empirical research rather than using projections
based simply on our theories or individual experiences. A bottom-up
approach takes an expansive and open-minded view of the impact of
law, and also includes within its purview a wide range of
socio-economic classes and interests. Indeed, at times, this approach
will reach outside of the boundaries of formal legal processes and
institutions altogether to examine other forms of regulation and
ordering. In order to do this, researchers will need to use empirical
tools to help them move beyond formal categories, and they will have
to remain skeptical about the impact of formal law. All of these
admonitions can be understood simply as tenets of doing good social
science research, because they seek to limit the degree to which
unexamined assumptions made by researchers wind up blinding them
to important parts of the picture they are studying.
Id. at 339-40. See also Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism:
Can A New World Order Prompt A New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009)
("[arguing] that law cycles recursively over time between the world and legal institutions,
which is why empirical and historical inquiry is essential to understanding law's actual
operation, its failures and successes."). But see Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The
New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 850-851 (2008) (discussing the New Legal
Realism and offering a cautious assessment and general qualification: "[1]egal academics
and the lawyers they train must often make normative evaluations of legal rules and
institutions on the basis of only partial information. They ought to do so with full
awareness of the limitations of their analyses .... The New Legal Realism remains in its
infancy. As it grows, we will learn much more.").
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example, the modernization of welfare eligibility is all about improving
the access of potential welfare recipients to benefits, have these reforms
in fact worked the way they were intended?31
But perhaps even more fundamentally, the marketization of
programs designed to serve vulnerable populations makes highly visible
the line between law and society, between the public and private
sectors, and between the federal and local government. The situation of
welfare recipients is shaped at the crux of a number of issues central to
the domestic face of globalization: the limits of the market (including
markets for labor), the limits of law, and the limits of power at the
various social and political levels of government and governance.
Marketized social programs also make more visible new forms of
identity, social mobility, and vulnerability, as the politics of
globalization take shape around and through them.
This article will look at privatized social services primarily from the
standpoint of finding new ways of understanding the role law can play
to re-embed marketized administrative approaches into the public
sector. The administration of these government services and duties does
not involve complete deregulation; therefore, these processes do not
totally separate the state from the market.3 2 New relationships are
forged; new mixes of public and private power are created. By
understanding the interactions involved in the privatization of domestic
social services more fully, we can suggest law reforms that can re-embed
the market into the state in new and effective ways. As we shall see,
this means rethinking the status of the service recipient-whom
privatization tends to rewrite as a product rather than a client or
stakeholder. This is a serious limitation, as the case study will show.
Finding new possibilities for marketized public-private relationships is
essential for re-embodying service recipients as citizens in the full sense
of the term-i.e. in terms of their access to the full range of social and
political protections. 33
31. See infra Part II.
32. See POLANYI, supra note 3, at 71. Of course, in today's world no one would
realistically suggest that the market and the state can be completely separate. You need
law to create property rights, enforce contracts and the like. But the question that does
arise, particularly in the context of vulnerable populations, is the extent to which you need
law to not only help increase efficiency but protect the rights of the individuals involved,
be they prisoners, immigrants or welfare recipients. Part III deals with legal approaches
that do precisely that in the context of welfare assistance. See infra Part III.
33. See Jon D. Michaels, Note, To Promote the General Welfare: The Republican
Imperative to Enhance Citizenship Welfare Rights, 111 YALE L.J. 1457, 1491-95 (2002)
(arguing that republican values inherent in American constitutional democracy imply that
"the right to minimal resource protection" is "necessary for political and civic
participation").
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In Part II, a discussion of welfare reform prefaces the Indiana case
study. In the case study, I examine further not only the use of market
concepts and processes to carry out what were previously governmental
tasks, but also the areas where the translation of business approaches
into governmental actions broke down-places where market
approaches to welfare applications did not or could not adequately
translate fully into the governmental tasks at hand. The attempts at
modernizing welfare administration in Indiana have relied heavily on
the efficiencies a private corporation could bring to welfare eligibility
decisions. There was, at least initially, a binary assumption built into
these modernization reforms. Market techniques and private providers
were to replace traditional government approaches that relied on
face-to-face contact by government employees. Government
modernization of benefits was to occur by outsourcing the
administration of the welfare program to a private entity rather than
insourcing modernization techniques into the government offices in
question.
With such binary thinking came the expectation that the private
sector would be, for the most part, automatically better than the
government itself at developing these new approaches.3 4 The
market-government binary that seemed very much to shape the early
thinking of how welfare could be modernized presumptively favored not
only new technological approaches, but also a conception of the task at
hand that treated welfare applicants as essentially a reasonably
homogeneous population of customers who could now fend for
themselves more easily with computer access and 800 numbers. As we
shall see, however, such a characterization can all too easily depoliticize
many of the highly individualized, personal issues involved that require
more than an abstract concern with access, while at the same time
adding an aura of objectivity to the outcomes achieved. More important,
as this case will also show, the state of Indiana was IBM's client and,
though the burdens of this contract were felt acutely by welfare
recipients, only Indiana could challenge IBM's performance of the
contract, which it ultimately did when it sued for breach of contract.
Welfare applicants and recipients, however, had to work through the
34. The government's contract did in theory reserve final decision-making to the
government and it did retain field offices in all ninety-two counties. Daniels Signs $1 Billion
Welfare Outsourcing Deal, WTHR.coM (Dec. 27, 2006), http://www.wthr.constory/58642921
daniels-signs-l-billion-welfare-outsourcing-deal?clienttype=printable. See also Indiana v. Int'l
Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 13-14 (Marion Super. Ct., Civ. Div.
10 July 18, 2012) (findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment for IBM). However, those
offices would become woefully understaffed, compared to what they were before the contracting
out of this program. Problems Noted as FSSA Privatization Begins, WTHR.coM,
http:llwww.wthr.com/global/story.asp?s=6732281&ClientT pe=Printable.
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state rather than protecting their rights as third-party beneficiaries of
this contract. To this extent, they were really neither clients nor even
customers, but the presumed recipients of an abstract product called
access. Even more important, the ability of welfare recipients to access
their benefits in a more efficient way was a form of wealth creation for
the state, allowing it to lower its costs and labor force. In reality,
however, these new forms of access were not successful in many cases.
The more the method of delivery of these services became disconnected
from outcomes in actual cases, the less such a contract could serve the
very population for which it was intended.
Welfare applicants, however, were neither customers nor IBM's
products. And legally speaking they were not clients either-they had
no independent rights under the contract as third-party beneficiaries. 35
They were, of course, citizens in dire economic need. They were a
diverse group, consisting of the elderly, disabled, children, single
parents, and individuals for whom a job may not have been available
due to their skill set or the relatively depressed state of the economy.
Moreover, given the fact that this case involves individuals at the
bottom of the economic and often educational ladder as well, the digital
divide when it comes to computer access and know-how can be quite
pronounced. 36 Carried too far, a primarily technological approach to
welfare eligibility makes technology itself a filter-since many potential
recipients may not have access to computers or even telephone call
centers. 37 These circumstances risk substituting technological, cost
efficient means for substantive benefits. As Professor Ronen Shamir has
written in his critique of corporate social responsibility, we need a
theory of translation when we apply neoliberal reform to traditional
forms of government regulation. "Such a theory must come to grips
with, and identify the pitfalls of, working within the non-governmental
organization institutional paradigm, because the latter is heavily biased
35. See discussion infra Part III.
36. See Bryan Corbin, RV to Help With Welfare, Medicaid, Food Stamp Concerns at
Deaconess Family Practice Today, COURIERPRESS.COM (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.courierpress.com/news/2009/jan/22/rv-help-welfare-medicaid-food-stamps-
concerns/?print=l; e.g., Perdue v. Murphy, 915 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
(describing the difficulty that one disabled woman had with using the modernized system
deployed by the FSSA in 2007).
37. Tennessee, for example, distributes a portion of their Medicaid benefits through a
kind of lottery system, in which benefits are given to the those qualified callers who are
able to dial-in to call centers before others. Abby Goodnough, Tennessee Race for Medicaid:
Dial Fast and Try Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2013, at Al.
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toward the corporate hegemonic model of organization and
implementation." 38 As a consequence,
[We] must also worry about the way the perceived
grievances of oppressed, marginal, and exploited
populations . . . are transformed into a meaningful
political and legal voice by relatively affluent and
secured.., experts who often speak the language of and
deploy the instruments of hegemonic rational
organizational and managerial systems characteristic of
contemporary capitalism. . . . [T]here seems to have
emerged a hegemonic cultural-institutional model
concerning the 'right way of doing things.' This right
way of doing things purports to be divorced from actual
substance as it deals with models, blueprints, protocols,
procedures, key words, and key concepts alone.3 9
Welfare modernization in Indiana illustrates the problems Shamir
identifies. As originally conceptualized and proposed, the welfare
reforms focused primarily on cost savings made possible by
technologically sophisticated means for assessing welfare eligibility,
rather than, quite literally, focusing on the welfare of the individuals
involved.40
The elimination of perceived corruption in the welfare eligibility
process was also a goal of modernization. 41 Reliance on market actors
and the best business practices they could implement meant that
face-to-face contact with government caseworkers in repeat situations
would be drastically reduced. The reasoning behind making the new
system relatively impersonal and decentralized was that the system was
likely to become more objective. 42 Caseworkers were assumed to be
prone to favor applicants and override eligibility criteria at their own
discretion. Critics of the existing system also argued that the
face-to-face system was susceptible to mistakes and fraud. Moreover,
38. RONEN SHAMIR, CORPORATE SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A CASE OF HEGEMONY AND
COUNTER-HEGEMONY IN LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 113 (Bonaventura de
Souse Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garvito, eds., 2005).
39. Id.
40. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process and Social-Cost Accounting, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1423, 1427 (1981); Michaels, supra note 33. See also infra note 154 and
accompanying text.
41. See infra note 76.
42. Indiana v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 32, 32
n.51 (Marion Super. Ct., Civ. Div. 10 July 18, 2012) (findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and judgment for IBM).
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they believed that the move to private providers would significantly
decrease the number of government employees on the state's payroll. As
we shall see, most welfare caseworkers became employees of the
companies to which the welfare program was outsourced.43
In short, the main goals of Indiana's modernization approach were
to increase access for welfare applicants through computers and call
centers, and in the process lower the number of government workers
involved by moving public employees to the private payrolls of the
private corporations with whom the government contracted. This
lowered the costs of administering the welfare program, while
presumably increasing the accuracy of the decisions made and
eliminating much of the fraud that had previously occurred. Market
perspectives and best practices approaches, especially computer access
and telephone call centers, privately run, would now substitute for most
of the face-to-face casework that had previously typified the now
discredited welfare eligibility approaches used by Indiana in the past.
This is where the outsourcing process began. What is remarkable
about the evolution of welfare modernization in Indiana, however, is
that various forms of what Polanyi might identify as the double
movement in action helped refocus welfare modernization on
substantive outcomes and less on new, efficient ways of servicing the
"customers" involved. Unforeseen events also intervened, including the
massive flooding in parts of Indiana in 2007 and the Great Recession of
2008. In the final analysis, however, the state may initially have
embraced the binary view that markets and market approaches are
superior to government when it came to administering welfare at the
state level, but ultimately the state backed away from so binary a view,
seeking instead to devise and implement what it called a more hybrid
approach to the administration of welfare benefits. 44
The Indiana case is interesting in part because the state itself
ultimately took some corrective action when it became clear the contract
to which it entered was not working the way it had hoped 45-a double
movement of sorts.46 Moreover, from the time this approach was
suggested political pushback, in the form of legislation, began. 47 In
43. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
45. See id.
46. See POLANYI, supra note 3, at 79-80 (referring to the social history in the
nineteenth century as a "double movement").
47. From 2006 to 2009, the Indiana legislature introduced a plethora of bills
addressing the privatization of government services and functions. Some of the proposals
were uninspired. See S. 425, 115th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) ("A contract
for services may not be entered into for a period of more than four (4) years unless a
statute specifically provides otherwise."). Others sought to implement comprehensive
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2007, the state even enacted a law requiring state agencies to allow for
public comment and testimony at a public hearing and obtain approval
from the state budget committee before it enters into a private contract
lasting at least four years and worth over $10 million, and in which a
private vendor provides services formerly performed by state
employees. 48
The double perspective of a global view of domestic reform coupled
with a domestic view of globalization helps us to understand more fully
these and other details of welfare reform in Indiana. These perspectives
reveal how marketized administrative approaches to welfare dis-embed
the state from the market yet, in the process, create the conditions for
re-embedding the state. In Indiana, as this article will detail, the
re-embedding process created new relationships between citizens and
government, as well as between the public and private sectors now
involved in welfare administration. As a result we can better see and
understand how the double movement described by Polanyi might
work-but after privatization, the return movement was, perhaps
surprisingly, initiated by the state. At the crux of these processes may
lie the transformation of the neoliberal state and an alternative
domestic approach to globalization.
II. WELFARE REFORM
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 ("Welfare Reform Act")49 was passed by the United States
Congress as an avowed program of economic and social change: it was
all about work--"workfare not welfare" was explicitly formulated to
eliminate dependency.5 0 To that end, the bill mandated work.51 The
Welfare Reform Act also devolved power and responsibility to the states.
procedures to accompany privatization, such as the creation of privatization review
committee that would oversee a crude form of agency rule-making procedures found in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. (2012). See H.B. 1062, 115th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007); S.B. 113, 114th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ind. 2006);
S.B. 241, 114th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ind. 2006); S.B. 63, 115th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2007); H.B. 1079, 114th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ind. 2006); H.B. 1215, 114th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ind. 2006); H.B. 1325, 114th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ind. 2006);
H.B. 1026, 115th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007).
48. S.B. 83, 115th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (codified at IND. CODE §
4-12-13 (2008)).
49. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (2012)).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
51. Id. at § 607. For a critical discussion of the dependency rationale, see Jon Michaels,
Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization
Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 600-04 (2004).
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Federal money was to go back to the states in the form of block grants
where states could, within broad guidelines, use the money as they saw
fit.52 Experimentation was a part of the plan.5 3 Some states used it to
create job training programs; 54 some used it to fund programs 'designed
to encourage character building and a deeper commitment to religious
faith-so called faith-based initiatives.
55
But many states that chose to continue to provide direct payments
to the poor decided to outsource these responsibilities to multinational
corporations (MNCs) such as Lockheed Martin, IBM, or Maximus
Corp.5 6 MNCs in some states took over the responsibility of determining
who should be on the welfare rolls and who should be eliminated
pursuant to state contracts and state oversight. 57 A global perspective
on outsourcing welfare administration reveals that, not unlike the drive
to privatize prisons, the driving forces behind this shift to market actors
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601(a) (stating that the purpose of the legislation is to "increase
the flexibility of the States."); 42 U.S.C. §§ 603-04. See also Michaels, supra note 51, at
600-04.
53. See Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 279-80
(2009).
54. See Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished
Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1559, 1564 (2001) ("Indeed, much of what the new model of welfare-to-work staff does
is to assign welfare clients to job readiness or work-training vendors."); Matthew Diller,
The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1181-82 (2000).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a, although the statute explicitly stated, "[n]o funds provided
directly to institutions or organizations to provide services and administer programs
under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section shall be expended for sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization." § 604a(j).
56. See BILL BERKOWITZ, PROSPECTING AMONG THE POOR: WELFARE PRIVATIZATION 15,
16 (2001), available at http://www.arc.org/pdf/296bpdf.pdf; M. BRYNA SANGER, THE
WELFARE MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION AND WELFARE REFORM 2, 74-76 (2003); Bach,
supra note 53, at 278 ("[T]he PRA joined a rising tide of initiatives to 'reinvent
government' by using private sector tools and entities to free government from the
constraints of what was seen as excessive bureaucracy and constrictive civil service
rules."); Diller, supra note 54, at 1147, 1180-83 ("Some states and counties further have
devolved welfare administration to private contractors."); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of
Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 89 (2003); Mark
Carl Rom, From Welfare State to Opportunity, Inc.: Public-Private Partnerships in Welfare
Reform, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 14, at 171-76.
57. See Bezdek, supra note 54, at 1566 (2001) ('The Act now authorizes states to
employ private entities to conduct intake and make eligibility determinations-traditional
gate-keeping functions of any benefits program-most often identified with the legal
protections developed under AFDC. Although nonprofits have been involved in service
delivery for decades, the Act has brought for-profit enterprises into social services
functions far beyond their prior limited roles as contractors for data systems."); Rom,
supra note 56, at 171-76.
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in the context of welfare administration was the belief that market
approaches to eligibility and the incorporation of business best practices
would make states more efficient and globally competitive by lowering
welfare administration costs and reducing errors and corruption.58 A
global perspective on domestic law reveals that by privatizing this
aspect of welfare administration, the Welfare Reform Act also had the
ironic effect of re-centralizing these decisions, not at the federal level,
but at the multinational corporate level.59 The underlying rationale was
that market approaches and best business practices were the best way
to reform what usually was seen as inefficient and-as we shall see in
the case on Indiana-even corrupt delivery systems; 60 though what
constituted corruption may have also included the exercise of discretion
by individual caseworkers. 61 Also implied in such outsourcing in the
welfare context was the idea that business approaches to welfare
administration would help encourage individual self-sufficiency and
independence.
In short, a MNC was substituted for state and federal government;
uniformity was achieved, but the kind of uniformity that comes with
finding an efficient way of proceeding. It was a type of uniformity that
would allow citizens of the state to minimize their costs and taxes, but
also enable the shareholders of the companies involved to maximize
their profits. They could do this by doing what they did best:
streamlining and computerizing their services. Computers and call
centers replaced caseworkers. The domestic face of a welfare recipient
was thus transformed from a citizen to an output or a product-one that
either deserved benefits or one that did not, and, in a sense, a customer
as well, in that they were to receive this information of entitlement or
non-entitlement promptly and with a minimum of face-to-face contact.62
58. See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 112 (1987);
Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1739, 1743-44 (2002); Jonathan Walters, The Welfare Bonanza, GOVERNING THE
STATES AND LOCALITIES, (January 2000), www.governing.com/topics/health-human-
services/Welfare-Bonanza.html.
59. IBM's role in planning and implementing Indiana's welfare modernization plan is a
case-in-point. See infra Part II.A.
60. See infra Part II.A.
61. In some cases, real corruption resulted in the unlawful distribution of welfare
benefits. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. However, in other cases, caseworkers
did not follow the 'letter-of-the-law" in order to avoid some of the harsh consequences that
recipients might have otherwise faced for failing to observe the minutiae of formal
procedure. See Indiana v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at
32, 32 n.51 (Marion Super. Ct., Civ. Div. 10 July 18, 2012) (findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and judgment for IBM).
62. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 32, 32 n.51;
Perdue v. Murphy, 915 N.E.2d 498, 500-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
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A domestic perspective on these global efficiency rationales,
however, must begin with some skepticism. Welfare benefits have a long
and complicated history, especially beginning with the turn to
neoliberalism that occurred in the Reagan-Thatcher era. 63 Indeed,
welfare recipients have not only been analyzed in multiple ways, 64 but
ridiculed as well, with the infamous image of the so-called "welfare
queen."65 Along with recent welfare to work reforms, others increasingly
have relied on the criminal law to minimize anticipated corruption.66
Against this political backdrop, the need for welfare has been
increasing. The disparity in incomes between the "haves" and
"have-nots" has grown dramatically, not only in the United States, but
globally as well.67 Moreover, poverty rates have risen substantially in
the United States, especially given the slow pace of economic recovery
after the financial meltdown of 2008.68 Is the modernization of welfare
intended primarily to address the increasing needs of individuals in
economic crisis by increasing access to the system, or is it designed
primarily to lower costs, quite apart from the substantive impact the
means of lowering costs might have on individual welfare applicants? To
what extent do the reforms involved take into account the differences in
welfare applicants, recognizing that they include the disabled, the
elderly, children, and individuals with various backgrounds, not all of
which are computer literate or self-sufficient when it comes to analyzing
the choices they may have to make? As the Indiana case shows, a
largely binary approach to market approaches as opposed to a fully
government administered program ultimately evolved into a hybrid
public-private partnership with some formal and informal changes in
law that offer some promise for the future and the beginnings of law
reforms designed to re-embed the market into the state.69
63. See generally KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 17-50 (2011).
64. See, e.g., id. at 38; OSCAR LEWIS, FIVE FAMILIES: MEXICAN CASE STUDIES IN THE
CULTURE OF POVERTY (1959); OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION
(1965); Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 187 (Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 1968).
65. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 63, at 34-38.
66. Id. at 6-8.
67. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY, at ix-xvi (2012).
68. Id.
69. See infra Part III.
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A. Privatizing Welfare Administration in Indiana
Indiana's welfare programs include the provision of food stamps, 70
Medicaid,71 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 72 and
other assistance programs for the needy. 73 They are administered by the
Family Social Service Administration (FSSA). According to a report
issued by FSSA in 2006, distribution and management of welfare
benefits in Indiana was among the worst in the United States, citing
fraud as a persistent problem.7 4
Between 2002 and 2006, at least fifteen caseworkers were arrested
for fraud for illicitly obtaining food stamps and TANF benefits. 75 In
addition, "at least [twenty-one] 'outside conspirators' have illegally
obtained benefits or committed some sort of fraud with the assistance of
FSSA staff."76 Moreover, high error rates were reported: 35.28 percent
70. 470 IND. ADMIN. CODE art. 6 (2012). See generally IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS.
ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, www.in.gov/fssa/dfr/2691.htm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (describing Indiana's food assistance program).
71. See IND. CODE § 12-15 (2012) (Indiana provisions relating to Medicaid). Indiana
provides other health care services in addition to Medicaid. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 12-16
(2012) (Payment for Health Services Other Than Medicaid); IND. CODE § 12-16.1 (2012)
(Hospital Care for the Indigent); IND. CODE § 16.5 (2012) (The Health Care Compact); IND.
CODE § 12-17.6 (2012) (Children's Health Insurance Program). See also IND. FAMILY &
SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., ABOUT MEDICAID/HEALTH PLANS, www.in.gov/fssa/dfr/4502.htm (last
visited Jan 31, 2013).
72. See IND. CODE § 12-14 (Indiana provisions relating to TANF). See also IND. FAMILY
& SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES,
www.in.gov/fssa/dfr/2684.htm (last visited Jan. 31 2013).
73. See IND. FAMILY & Soc. SERVS. ADMIN., www.in.gov/fssa/index.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2013) (listing services provided by the Indiana FSSA); ERIN LINVILLE, IND.
FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., ELIGIBILITY MODERNIZATION: THE NEED FOR CHANGE 6-8
(2006) [hereinafter FSSA REPORT], available at web.courierpress.com/ecp/PDF/
EligibihtyModernization08l7O6.pdf (explaining the history of the FSSA and public
assistance programs in Indiana).
74. See FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 4-5 ("In the past decade, Indiana ranked 50th
in the percent reduction of citizens on welfare."). See also Indiana v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 3-4 (Marion Super. Ct., Civ. Div. 10 July 18,
2012) (findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment for IBM); Press Release, Governor
Mitch Daniels, State Ends Contract with IBM for Welfare Services (Oct. 15, 2009)
[hereinafter State Ends Contract], available at http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/
EventList.aspx?fromdate=l/1/2009&todate=2/31/2009&display=Month&type=public&eve
ntidn=61938&view=EventDetails&informationid=124951&print-print.
75. See FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 19. See also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ANNUAL
REPORT (2006), available at http://www.in.gov/igfilesOIG_2006_Annual-Report.pdf (detailing
the office's role in prosecuting thirteen individuals for welfare-related fraud).
76. FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 19. Assisted by the Indiana Inspector General, several
kinds of fraud cases were brought against both welfare recipients and caseworkers by Indiana
prosecutors from 2005 to 2008. Some welfare recipients failed to accurately report their income.
See, e.g., DAVID 0. THOMAS, LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE WELFARE FRAUD, INSPECTOR
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in determining long-term care eligibility, 28.80 percent for TANF
eligibility, and 12.04 percent for food stamps eligibility.77 FSSA also
GENERAL REPORT, 2005-12-0601 (Nov. 20, 2006) (individual provided falsified income
information to FSSA to qualify for public assistance); DAVID 0. THOMAS, MARION COUNTY
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 1, INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2005-06-0303 (Nov. 21, 2006)
(failing to report income); DAVID 0. THOMAS, MARION COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 2,
PRELIMINARY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (reporting income as
zero even though gainfully employed); DAVID 0. THOMAS, MARION COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
FRAUD - 3, PRELIMINARY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (failing to
report gainful employment). Other individuals were arrested for assisting in attempting to apply
for benefits using false information. See, e.g., DAVID 0. THOMAS, MARION COUNTY PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 4, PRELIMINARY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29,
2006) (caseworker used false Social Security number and date of birth, but the correct address of
felon to apply for food stamps); DAVID 0. THOMAS, MARION COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD -
9, PRELIMINARY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (reporting an
income of zero even though actual income was over $100,000); DAVID 0. THOMAS, MARION
COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 10, PRELIMINARY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2005-06-
0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (reporting an income of zero even though actual income was over $100,000).
Others were charged for using or selling fraudulent Electronic Benefits (EBT) cards--cards akin
to ATM cards used to grant access to public assistance monies. See, e.g., DAVID 0. THOMAS,
MARION COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 5, PRELIMINARY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT,
2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (using fraudulent EBT card); DAVID 0. THOMAS, MARION COUNTY
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 6, 2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (using fraudulent EBT card);
DAVID 0. THOMAS, MARION COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 7, PREIMINARY INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORT, 2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (using fraudulent EBT card); DAVID 0. THOMAS,
MARION COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 8, PRELIMINARY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT,
2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (using and selling fraudulent EBT cards); DAVID 0. THOMAS,
MARION COUNTY PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD - 11, PRELIMINARY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT,
2005-06-0303 (Dec. 29, 2006) (using fraudulent EBT card). Still others provided other forms of
false information to increase the amount of benefits received. See, e.g., DAVID 0. THOMAS,
MEDICAID FRAUD, INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2008-04-0090 (Oct. 22, 2008) (failing to report
that husband lived in home and that he provided income); DAVID 0. THOMAS, DELEWARE
COUNTY TANF FRAUD, INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2006-03-0128 (Apr. 16, 2007) (submitting
forged documents, such as letters from landlords and leases). Charges have also been brought
against caseworkers for assisting in fraud by failing to collect relevant information or
distributing or selling unauthorized EBT cards that gave access to public assistance monies. See,
e.g., DAVID 0. THOMAS, EBT FRAUD, INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2005-06-0303 (Nov. 16, 2005)
(establishing over twenty false accounts and issuing EBT cards to themselves); DAVID 0.
THOMAS, FORT WAYNE FSSA CASEWORKER FRAUD, INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2007-03-0055
(Apr. 25, 2007) (issuing EBT cards in friend's name and splitting the proceeds). Other
caseworkers have been arrested for maintaining fictitious accounts and collecting the benefits for
themselves. See, e.g., DAVID 0. THOMAS, EBT FRAUD IN ALLEN COUNTY, INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT, 2007-03-0062 (Nov. 20, 2007) (using fictitious people and keeping case files open to
obtain benefits); DAVID 0. THOMAS, DELAWARE COUNTY EBT FRAUD, INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT, 2006-11-0321 (Apr. 16, 2007) (using falsified identities to obtain EBT benefits); DAVID
0. THOMAS, MARION COUNTY EBT FRAUD, INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, 2007-02-0046 (Mar. 29,
2007) (creating false case files and obtaining EBT cards when they were returned in the mail to
the office).
77. FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 17. See also OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, INDIANA
STATE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE REPORT: JULY - DECEMBER 2006, at 7 (2007),
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faced potential criticism for inhibiting welfare beneficiaries from moving
beyond the program to self-reliance.78 Indiana ranked last in the nation
when it came to moving welfare recipients off welfare and to work as the
1996 federal law sought to do.79
When Governor Mitch Daniels was elected in 2004, he brought a
market reform perspective to many areas of state government, welfare
included.80 During his time as governor, he succeeded in privatizing
various state functions, including certain functions of the prison system.
He also outsourced the maintenance and operation of an Indiana toll
road to a private firm.8' Welfare reform was also on his agenda. From
the early days of his administration, he became particularly concerned
that Indiana's welfare system was broken and "plagued by high error
rates, fraud, wasted dollars, poor conditions for its employees, and very
available at
http://in.gov/governorhistory/mitchdaniels/files/Performance -Report- 4-(Jul-Dec-2006).pdf
(report published on March 30, 2007 stating that "[iun 2005 FSSA paid Food Stamps
recipients $33.9 million more than they were entitled" because of error). However,
contrary to the reported instances above, not all recipients accused of fraud in the United
States are attempting to game the system. While data for Indiana is unavailable, some
studies have shown that much of the rule breaking in welfare law is done unknowingly as
a result of recipients' ignorance or misunderstanding of the rules involved. See, e.g.,
GUSTAFSON, supra note 63, at 3, 129, 161. Additionally, caseworkers in Indiana have in
some instances "bent the rules" not for personal gain but because they were sympathetic
to the recipient. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 32.
78. See FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 18. The report stated the issue as follows:
As a result of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, the federal government requires
that states meet a workforce participation for TANF recipients of 50%. In other words,
50% of Hoosier TANF recipients must be engaged in meaningful work-related activity,
either working in a job or an Indiana Manpower and Comprehensive Training
(IMPACT)-sponsored activity like volunteer work. (Certain TANF recipients, such as
nonparent caretakers, are exempt from this calculation.) Indiana has historically had a
workforce participation rate near 33%. With Congress passing the TANF Reauthorization
earlier this year, the 50% workforce participation requirement will be strictly enforced,
and Indiana is at risk for failing to meet this requirement. This could cost the state up to
5% of its TANF block grant, or $10.3 million, and the federal government could require
that Indiana replace these lost federal funds with state funds.
79. See id. at 4-5 (CIn the past decade, Indiana ranked 50th in the percent reduction of
citizens on welfare."); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 3-4;
State Ends Contract, supra note 74.
80. See Mitchell E. Daniels, Reforming Government Through Competition, in ANNUAL
PRIVATIZATION REPORT 2006: TRANSFORMING GOVERNMENT THROUGH PRIVATIZATION
10-13 (Leonard Gilroy ed., 2006) [hereinafter Daniels, Reforming Government], available
at http://www.reason.org/apr2006; Jonathan Rauch, Mitch Daniels on How Libertarians
Can Govern, THE BROWSER, http://thebrowser.com/interviews/mitch-daniels-on-how-
libertarians-can-govern (last visited Jan. 31, 2013); Brian Doherty, Mitch Daniels: A
Politician Who Likes Good Books, REASON.COM (July 7, 2010, 12:58 PM),
http://reason.com/blog/2010/07/07/mitch-daniels-a-politician-who.
81. Daniels, Reforming Government, supra note 80, at 12.
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poor service to its clients."8 2 Almost as soon as he became governor, he
and other state officials began developing a welfare reform plan
modeled on an approach that had recently been taken in Texas and
called the "remote eligibility" model.8 3 The model allowed recipients to
apply for public benefits through a variety of channels-by fax or mail,
over the phone, through the Internet, or in person. Through one of these
avenues, recipients would contact call centers, which would process all
applications and renewals. Recipients could then track the progress of
their applications online or through an automated phone system.8 4
Governor Daniels, in accord with his overall plans for privatization
in various other governmental areas,8 5 sought to outsource the intake
and processing of welfare claims as a remedy for the deficiencies he saw
in Indiana's welfare programs. Under this model, Indiana citizens would
82. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 3.
83. In the mid-1900s, Texas began efforts to privatize eligibility determinations for
fifteen welfare programs, known as Texas Integrated Enrollment System (TIES). Rom,
supra note 56, at 175. A single firm would be responsible for operating and maintaining an
"automated eligibility determination, single-state system." HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
COMMISSION, HOUSE BILL 3575: HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ELIGIBILITY SYSTEM
TRANSITION PLAN (October 2007) [hereinafter TEXAS PLAN], available at
http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/consolidation/IE/HB_3575_TransitionPlan.pdf. Although
Texas' effort was approved by the federal government in 1997, the plan was opposed by
many Texas public employees, and implementation stalled. Rom, supra note 56, at 175.
However, in 2003, Texas began to implement the TIES program when it passed House Bill
2292, directing the Health and Human Services Commission to "contract with at least one
but not more than four private entities for the operation of call centers required by this
section unless the commission determines that contracting would not be cost-effective."
H.B. 2292, 2003 Leg., 78th Reg. Sess. § 2.06 (Tex. 2003) (codified at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 531.063 (West 2003)). The four call centers would determine eligibility for and
coordinate enrollment in TANF, food stamps, Medicaid, and other programs.
Modernization efforts were reaffirmed in 2007 when the Texas Legislature passed House Bill
3575, which established a legislative oversight committee to oversee with the transition to a
modern eligibility system. H.B. 3575, 2007 Leg., 80th Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex. 2007) (codified at TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 531.456 (West 2007)). For a detailed overview of the history of Texas'
modernization efforts, see generally TEXAS PLAN, supra. See also Christy G. Black & Joe
Barnett, A New Frontier for Welfare Reform, Brief Analysis No. 539, NAVL CENTER FOR POLY
ANALYSIS (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ncpa.orgpdfs/ba539.pdf ('Texas is about to roll
out an ambitious program using private contractors to streamline the process of applying for
public health and welfare programs."); TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., IMPROVING THE
APPLICATION PROCESS, http://web.archive.org/web/20121026204005/
http://www.hhs.state.tx.us/consolidation/IE/IE.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2013); Press
Release, Tex. Health & Human Servs., HHSC Estimates $646 Million in Savings from
Call Centers (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.hhs.state.tx.us/news/
release/063005_CallCenters.shtml; Press Release, Tex. Health & Human Servs., New
Eligibility System Rolls Out in Travis, Hays Counties (Jan. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1025897751.html.
84. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 83, at 1.
85. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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apply for welfare benefits via the Internet or through call centers rather
than face-to-face meetings in welfare offices. Eligibility determinations
would be done on a centralized statewide basis rather than in local
county offices. Best business practices would be used and this meant
that, to the greatest extent possible, the elimination of office visits and
face-to-face meetings with government welfare caseworkers.8 6
In October 2005, FSSA issued a Request for Information (RFI),8 7
which sought vendors to assist with a state program "to redesign the
state's process and systems for determination of client eligibility for
public assistance," a system that "should enable Indiana citizens to
enroll with a minimum of personal visits."8 8 The desired outcome was a
"decrease in volume going through local offices."8 9 By emphasizing that
clients should be able to apply in person, through the Internet, over the
phone, by fax, or mail, the RFI also sought to increase the
self-sufficiency of applicants for social services. 90  Presumably,
self-sufficiency in this context meant that they did not need anyone's
face-to-face assistance to determine whether they were eligible for
benefits and if so, which ones and how best to apply for them. Moreover,
there was a level of computer savvy assumed that was unrealistic for
this population of potential "clients."
86. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 4.
87. The Indiana Department of Administration explains the significance of a request
for information as follows:
An agency may choose to research information on a proposed [Request
for Proposal) (RFP) without having to commit to doing an RFP by
doing a Request for Information (RFI). The RFI is used by agencies to
gain information on specifications and pricing for new products,
programs or services. The RFI strictly requests information and a
contract will not result from the RFI. The RFI is not to be used as a
tool to "pre-select" vendors. Responses to the RFI will remain
confidential until after the RFP is complete. If no RFP is issued, the
RFI responses become public information after the decision is made
not to proceed with an RFP.
IND. DEP'T. OF ADMIN., STATE OF INDIANA VENDOR HANDBOOK 8 (2012), available at
http://www.in.gov/idoa/files/vendor-handbook.pdf.
88. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 6. The Indiana
Department of Administration, acting on behalf of FSSA, followed standard contract
procurement procedure by public-private agreement. See generally IND. CODE § 5-23-5-1
(2012). In its Request for Proposal it stated explicitly, "[tlhis procurement will proceed
under IC 5-23, however, we will follow specified sections of IC 5-22 when noted." IND.
DEP'T OF ADMIN & IND. FAMILY & Soc. SERVS. ADMIN., STATE OF INDIANA: REQUEST FOR
PROPOSAL 6-58: SOLICITATION FOR ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION SERVICES 6 (2006),
available at http://web.pdx.edu/-pcooper/RFP-6-58.pdf. For an exhaustive discussion of
Indiana's procurement process, see generally IND. DEP'T OF ADMIN., supra note 87.
89. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 6 (alterations in
original omitted).
90. Id.
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On January 3, 2006, "IBM and a group of [twelve] coalition
companies called the 'Hoosier Coalition for Self Sufficiency' submitted a
response to the RFI."'91 The largest portion of the work among the
Coalition members and the largest part of the compensation was to go to
Affiliated Computer Services (ACS)-a subsidiary of Xerox-which
employed the personnel assisting the processing of eligibility
applications. 92 The state then issued a Request for Proposal and for Best
and Final Offer, at which point other participating bidders dropped out,
leaving the IBM Coalition as the only potential contract partner. 93
"Having concluded that the state itself could not modernize its system
on its own without the assistance of an independent vendor, on May 11,
2006, [Indiana] announced its intention to award the eligibility
modernization contract to the IBM Coalition."94
This approach is what the Family and Social Services
Administration recommended in its 2006 report, Eligibility
Modernization: The Need for Change. 95 The FSSA report described to
the Governor what he seemed already to have anticipated: "terrible
customer service"96 in the welfare offices that the researchers visited.
Citizens in need were "forced" to make more than two million trips a
year to various welfare offices around the state.97 To remedy this
situation, one of the state's requirements for the new system they had in
mind was to "reduce the number of mandatory visits to local offices" by
"giving clients more avenues to interact with the agency" such as "the
Internet, an automated and interactive phone system, and local
organizations in the community."98 There was also evidence that such
visits were not only inefficient-wasting the time of Indiana citizens-
but they led to corruption as well. 99 On the other hand, less face-to-face
time freed up caseworkers to do other things as well. As one state
official put it, "[i]t's better for them and cheaper for us if they don't come
into the office."'100
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 6-7. This is not dissimilar from patterns in other privatized settings where
the number of competitors involved is usually smaller than the market theory of
competition might suggest. The private prison context is a ready example. See supra note
16.
94. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 7.
95. FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 26-28.
96. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 5.
97. Id.
98. FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 5.
99. Indiana v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 32, 32
n.51 (Marion Super. Ct., Civ. Div. 10 July 18, 2012) (findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and judgment for IBM).
100. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 6.
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The question of whether to outsource these modernizing tasks to a
private provider was never aired publicly. Whether new technologies
could, in effect, be insourced to the government rather than contracted
out to the private sector was a question that could have benefitted from
public discussion before the decision to outsource was made. Nor was
the question of whether these types of reforms were worth pursuing,
given the complexity and diverse nature of the makeup of the welfare
applicant pool. The question of under what contractual terms the
outsourcing project should proceed, however, was subject to additional
consideration and public consultation of a sort. Before the contract to
outsource welfare eligibility to IBM was signed, the governor appointed
an Interagency Review Committee chaired by his own chief of staff and
consisting of the heads of six state agencies. 101 The committee worked
for seven months and made further modifications before approving the
overall concept and design of the system as outlined in that contract. 10 2
The changes were based on the experiences of other states and the
committee's analysis of what it thought some of the risks might be. 0 3
There were, however, no public hearings on the contract terms
ultimately crafted by this committee. The public representative
character of this committee consisted of the fact that the members were
all a part of the government, appointed by the governor, and serving as
heads of their respective administrative agencies. The representation on
this committee could have been considerably broader and included
actual welfare recipients or their public interest advocates.'0 4 As I shall
argue below in part III, a more inclusive process should be
institutionalized when future outsourcing occurs, especially when it
involves potentially vulnerable populations such as welfare recipients.
As noted above, perhaps the most important goal of the state's
reforms was to move away from face-to-face meetings and a fully
government-run, caseworker-based system. In addition to being more
efficient by lessening trips to a welfare office, the review committee
found that "[t]he proposed eligibility system would lessen fraud and
abuse by limiting the opportunities a client has to collude with a
caseworker because caseworkers would no longer control cases from
opening to close."' 05 Every time a welfare recipient consulted the
company involved, they would get a different person responding to their
questions. The system had become largely decentralized in that sense.
101. Id at 7.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Cf. id. at 7 (noting the composition of the committee).
105. Id. at 8 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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Governor Daniels also directed the Review Committee to ensure
that the state employees who were let go and went to work for the
selected vendor receive the same or better base salary and comparable
benefits to state employees. 0 6 This had the effect of reducing the state's
workforce and its employee budget as well. 10 7 In addition, the committee
noted Indiana's policy initiative aimed to promote the development of
policies and procedures that underscored the importance of work,
accuracy, and caseload integrity across all areas of public assistance and
that the governor had "specifically asked the Review Committee to
assess whether the path to modernization would help welfare recipients
become economically self-sufficient."'' 0 8 Presumably, this was an attempt
to encourage work whenever possible over the benefits being provided,
in accord with the thrust of the 1996 federal act. Another failing of
Indiana before this plan was put into effect was that it ranked 50th
among the states in the number of welfare recipients that were moved
from welfare to work.10 9
The review committee identified several areas of risk in
implementing this new system. Modernization of this kind, it noted, had
proven to be a significant challenge, as no state had successfully
undertaken the task before. 1 0 They were aware that both Texas"' and
106. Id. Despite the comparable benefits, there is evidence that there were issues
related to the change in employment for many former state employees. A report issued by
the United States Department of Agriculture noted the following:
Many state employees became ACS employees, which resulted in
stressful relationships between individuals who were no longer
colleagues. The tension is compounded by different employers being
co-located in a single office, each with its own personnel policies (e.g.,
mandatory overtime and dress code). In addition, many people were
fearful that they were going to lose their jobs.
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFFICE OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS,
ENHANCING SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP) CERTIFICATION:
SNAP MODERNIZATION EFFORTS: FINAL REPORT 56 (2010), available at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/ora/MENU/Published/snap/FILES[ProgramOperations/Enhanced
Certification.Vol2Final.pdf. Indiana state workers do not belong to a union; it was
unlikely that that would change as a result of the contract.
107. Indiana state workers are nonunionzed. See Dan Carden, Status of Government
Employee Unions Key Difference Between Illinois, Indiana, NWI.COM (Oct. 8, 2011, 9:00
PM), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/state-and-regional/indiana/article_81a9cd78-aeOe-
5beb-a141-df4543e2357a.html.
108. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 8.
109. FSSA REPORT, supra note 73, at 4.
110. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 14. At this time,
Texas had only partially implemented its efforts to modernize and privatize its welfare
system. See supra note 83. Moreover, Texas had run into problems along the way and
ended up terminating its contract with the company that ran these call centers in 2007.
See Press Release, Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm'n, HHSC, Texas Access Alliance
Agree to End Contract Early (Mar. 13, 2007), available at
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:1
Florida 12 had partially modernized certain segments of state welfare,
but on a smaller scale. Modernization in Indiana would require a "brand
new work flow and document management system" and "changing the
ingrained habits of ... hundreds of thousands of employees." 113 Still, the
Review Committee believed that the status quo was unacceptable and
recommended going ahead, noting that "[e]ssential governmental
functions and governmental oversight and control will be retained by
the state."114
On December 27, 2006, the Governor announced an agreement
worth $1.34 billion with IBM and ACS to assume control of the
programs." 5 Not only would the companies begin processing claims,
they would drastically change the means by which claims were received,
analyzed, and approved. The initial press release suggested the scope of
the changes involved:
[t]he plan envisions improving delivery of the public
safety-net benefits system received by one in six
Hoosiers, by making it easier to apply through the
http:/web.archive.org/web/20121031020057/http://www.hhs.state.tx.us/news/release/03130
7_AccessAlliance.shtml.
111. See supra note 83.
112. Florida currently runs and operates a modernized system called ACCESS Florida; the
system runs the administration of food stamps, cash benefits, and Medicaid. See U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIc., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFFICE OF RESEARCH, NUTRITION & ANALYSIS,
MODERNIZATION OF THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM IN FLORIDA: FINAL REPORT xix (2008), available
at httpJ/www.fiis.usda.gov/ora/MENU/Published/snap/FILES/ProgramOperations/
FloridaModern.pdf. C'ACCESS Florida eliminates the old caseworker model of public
assistance. Instead of each client having a single caseworker as their point-of-contact, clients
may use technology to apply for benefits, and to retrieve and update their case information.
When clients do interact directly with DCF staff, such as during eligibility interviews, they are
served by the next available worker since the state's technology allows any worker to access all
case information."). See also Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, ACCESS Florida,
http://www.myflfamilies.com/service-programs/access-florida-food-medical-assistance-cash (last
visited Nov. 2, 2012). Although the state had initially intended to outsource operation of
ACCESS Florida to a private firm, the Florida Legislature prohibited that particular effort at
privatization. Act effective July 1, 2005, ch. 2005-61, § 6, 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2005-61
(West) (repealing 2004 Fla. Laws ch. 2004-267, § 114). Thus, ACCESS Florida is a modernized
system run entirely by the government. Since 2006, Florida has attempted to privatize its
Medicaid program, but has not been successful. See Steve Gara, Florida Medicaid Program in
Limbo, EXAMINER.cOM (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/florida-medicaid-
program-limbo.
113. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 14 (citation and
emphasis omitted).
114. Id. at 9.
115. See id. at 6, 9. See also Press Release, State of Ind., Governor Signs Contract to
Modernize State Eligibility System (Dec. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.in.gov/apps/utils/calendar/presscal?PF=aiin&Clist=196&Elist=87904.
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Internet and telephone call centers. It also aims to use
computers to drive the process with self surveys, instead
of time-consuming interviews, to ease case workers'
paperwork and reduce error and fraud. 116
The governor was unequivocal in stating the benefits of the new
deal:
For taxpayers, a billion dollars of savings . . . For
recipients, better service and a better chance to escape
welfare for the world of work and self- reliance. For
employees, better compensation and career prospects.
For the Indiana economy, 1,000 new quality jobs. No
decision we've made is more clearly in the public
interest. 117
The state would save money through the consortium's automated
system for welfare claims by reducing the amount of paperwork and
reliance on in-person counseling-thereby reducing the requisite
manpower. 118 That said, each of Indiana's ninety-two counties would
"retain an office where people could apply in person for benefits, and all
final eligibility determinations would be made by state employees."119
Nevertheless, the staff in these offices could now be significantly
reduced.
B. The Contract
The goals of corporate centralization and state based cost-savings
were embodied in the contract (Master Services Agreement or MSA)
Indiana entered into with IBM, a contract that sought to "transform and
modernize the process by which information needed or related to
making eligibility determinations is collected, organized, and managed."
The overarching policy objectives of the Modernization Project and the
Agreement were
(i) to provide efficient, accurate and timely eligibility
determinations for individuals and families who qualify
116. Daniels Signs $1 Billion Welfare Outsourcing Deal, WTHR.COM (Dec. 27, 2006),
http://www.wthr.com/story/5864292/daniels-signs- 1-billion-welfare-outsourcing-
deal?clienttype=printable.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
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for public assistance, (ii) to improve the availability,
quality and reliability of the services being provided to
Clients by expanding access to such services, decreasing
inconvenience and improving response times, among
other improvements, (iii) to assist and support Clients
through programs that foster personal responsibility,
independence and social and economic self-sufficiency,
(iv) to assure compliance with all relevant Laws, (v) to
assure the protection and integrity of Personal
Information gathered in connection with eligibility
determination, and (vi) to foster the development of
policies and procedures that underscore the importance
of accuracy in eligibility determinations, caseload
integrity across all areas of public assistance and work
and work-related experience for Clients in the
Programs.120
IBM would determine eligibility for Food Stamps, Medicaid, and
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).121
A memorandum of understanding executed with the MSA also
emphasized the importance of economic development activities that
were "part consideration" for the MSA.122 The Governor observed that
the economic benefits they anticipated were of "enormous importance to
the Indiana economy," and his announcement would have been "just as
big" if the Project involved those efforts alone. 123 Indeed, "[olut of about
2,200 current FSSA employees [previously] performing the work, about
700 would be retained by the agency. The remaining 1,500 FSSA
employees were guaranteed jobs with the IBM group for two years at no
less than equal pay and benefits. '124 The contract received initial
approval from the federal government. The Departments of Health and
Human Services and Agriculture conditionally blessed the arrangement,
promising to give more money with the successful completion of the first
120. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 10.
121. Id. at 12, 16-17. The Food Stamp program, currently referred to as the
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), provides food assistance to people
and families with little or no income. See supra note 70. TANF is a program that provides
cash assistance and supportive services to assist families with children under age
eighteen, helping them achieve economic self-sufficiency. See supra note 72. Medicaid is a
health insurance program that provides insurance to recipients based on criteria such as
income and family size, age, and medical needs. See supra note 71.
122. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 11.
123. Id.
124. Daniels Signs $1 Billion Outsourcing Deal, supra note 116.
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stages of the plan. 125 The first phase of the plan was to be implemented
in the state's northern counties and gradually introduced to the
others.126
The MSA provided that the modernized system would be rolled out
in stages.127 Initially, IBM would assist in processing social services
applications under the existing system. 28 Next, the modernization
system would be implemented on a region-by-region basis.129 After this
transition period, the project would reach a "steady state" once
implemented in all counties. 130 The MSA established that the state
retained all policy-making authority over the project as well as sole
authority to make, and sole responsibility for, all eligibility
determinations. 131
The MSA incorporated Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which if
the IBM Coalition failed to meet, would be liable for liquidated
damages. 132 These KPIs required that 99 percent of food stamp cases,
Medicaid case actions, Medicaid Disability applications, and TANF case
actions be fully processed and transferred to the state no later than
three business days prior to the established Federal and State
Timelines. 133 Liquidated damages of $5,000 were owed per month in
which these KPIs were not met, beginning in September 2008.134 Other
KPIs included that call response time should have a mean of 120
seconds or less and hold times for phone calls to the call center should
have a mean less than three minutes.135
The plan did not receive universal support. There was some
political push back from the very start. Then Indiana House Speaker
Patrick Bauer claimed that the "Daniels administration was allowing
private companies to 'profit from the poor."' 136 He and fellow Democrats
warned of the possible deprivation of due process rights should
regulators lose oversight of the companies."37 Though Speaker Bauer
125. See id.
126. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 15, 20.
127. See id. at 12, 15, 20 (citing MSA § 3.2.1(2)).
128. Id. at 12 (citing MSA § 3.1.3).
129. Id. (citing MSA § 3.2.1(2)).
130. Id. (citing MSA § 3.2.1(1)).
131. Id. at 12-13 (quoting MSA §§ 3.1.1(6)).
132. Id. at 15-17 (quoting Schedule 10 to the MSA at § 4.2.2).
133. Id. at 16-17.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 17.
136. Daniels Signs $1 Billion Outsourcing Deal, supra note 116.
137. See id. As noted above, Indiana procured its contract with IBM by means of the
statutory authority delegated to the Indiana Department of Administration to enter into
contractual service agreements. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. The Texas
executive branch, on the other hand, worked more directly with the legislature, gaining
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promised to hold legislative hearings on the agreement, Governor
Daniels nevertheless moved ahead with the contract, suggesting that
"he did not need legislative approval to move forward ... and that many
state government services have been outsourced under previous
administrations."'13 8 He was right. The contract procurement process
proceeded like any other government contract for services: the Indiana
Department of Administration, acting on behalf of FSSA, issued a
request for proposal, negotiated with IBM, and eventually carried the
procurement process to completion.1 39
This was a public-private undertaking. The state, theoretically at
least, retained all policy-making authority over the modernization
project. And it had a direct operational role in the modernization project
itself. It also retained sole authority to make and the sole responsibility
for all eligibility determinations, should it decide to use them.140 This
arrangement was also recognized as experimental in nature and a
project with considerable challenges to overcome. The experiences in
Texas and Florida were not encouraging and the very nature of the
undertaking was extremely difficult.141 The programs falling within the
project were complex and the processing and approval of applications for
benefits for these programs were highly individualized determinations
based on unique facts and circumstances.1 42 IBM's performance
indicators, however, were pragmatic: 143 calls answered, speed at which
they were dealt with, accuracy of the determinations, and the like. But
assumptions were made about the "welfare customers" that really did
not fit the characteristics of the population to be served. The digital
divide seemed never to come up in the planning or the implementation
of this new system. Many if not most welfare recipients were not likely
explicit legislative approval to privatize limited portions of the welfare system in 2003 and
explicit approval to proceed with modernization under the watch of a legislative oversight
committee in 2007. See supra note 83. Neither Indiana nor Texas proceeded without the
delegated authority of the legislature, but in hindsight, Texas did enjoy the benefit of
moving forward in an environment of greater political consensus than Indiana.
138. Daniels Signs $1 Billion Outsourcing Deal, supra note 116.
139. See supra note 88; Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at
6-7. See also id. at 7 n.13 (noting Governor Daniels' view that a more elaborate version of
the "normal procurement decision process" was used here).
140. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 13.
141. Id. at 14. For a discussion of the Texas and Florida modernization efforts and the
difficulties experienced in those states, see Mary R. Mannix, Cary LaCheen, Henry A.
Freedman & Marc Cohan, Public Benefits Privatization and Modernization: Recent
Developments and Advocacy, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., May-June 2008, at 4, 5-12, available at
http://www.nclej.org/documentsfPublicBenefitsPrivatizationandModernization-
RecentDevelopmentsandAdvocacy_000.pdf.
142. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 15.
143. Id.
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to be familiar with or even have access to computer technology. And
even access to telephones was not always possible depending upon the
condition of the applicant. 144
But quite apart from the access issues involving telephones and
computers, the population of potential beneficiaries clearly could benefit
from a face-to-face encounter, particularly where benefits might turn on
their ability to work or not work. Objective criteria such as age,
education, and willingness to work are given their real meaning when a
caseworker can see the applicant. Such seemingly objective criteria do
not stand up to actually observing an applicant's physical well-being to
determine what they can and cannot realistically do.145 Issues such as
these were raised in the early days of welfare programs and formed the
basis of a due process right to a hearing for those about to lose their
benefits in the famous case of Goldberg v. Kelly. 146 It may be that there
is less need for elaborate adjudicatory proceedings to sort out the issues
involved in most cases, but the ability to see the applicant adds
enormously to the ability of a caseworker to make the correct decision
and provides a modicum of dignity to the applicant, especially if they
are ultimately rejected. 147 Moreover, the applicant is likely to have a
number of questions that he or she may not be able to articulate fully
without help from the caseworker. Presumably the telephone might be a
substitute for such a conversation, but the impersonal nature of the call
coupled with the fact that the person on the other end of the line is not
likely to be, and specifically is not intended to be, the same person with
whom this applicant may have spoken to before.148
These limitations-access to computers, timely access to telephones,
and the ability to actually see the condition of the applicant-were arguably
foreseeable challenges, but no one could have predicted the "perfect storm"
that awaited the roll-out of this new approach to welfare. The Great
Recession hit in 2008, with the number of claims for assistance growing
enormously: benefit applications rose 21 percent and unemployment in
144. See infra notes 173 and accompanying text.
145. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 34 (1985);
Mashaw, supra note 40, at 1437; William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in
the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-19 (1983) (discussing the rise of formalism in
welfare administration).
146. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
147. See id. at 263-65 (balancing the interests of the applicant's due process rights
against the government's interest in conserving state resources).
148. See Int7 Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 7-8 ("Rather than be
assigned to a single caseworker, clients would be able to contact and work with a variety of
people in multiple settings."') (internal quotation marks omitted); Perdue v. Murphy, 915 N.E.2d
498, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) ('While it is mathematically possible, it is unlikely that a client
calling about his or her case would speak to the same employee each time.").
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Indiana skyrocketed to 10.6 percent.1 49 Congress' stimulus plan designed to
deal with this downturn increased the amount of benefits to food stamp
recipients, which resulted in a huge increase in workload for IBM and its
subcontractors. 15° There were also a number of natural disasters that befell
Indiana at that time, including the 2008 floods.151 All of this increased the
number of applicants asking for benefits that far outstripped what the
original contract anticipated.1 52 This is not to say that a purely
governmental system would not also have been inundated by the increase in
claims, but the enormous increase in demand and the fact it was
unanticipated highlights a dilemma involved when a customer service
contract model is in play. The government had purchased only a certain
amount of service and one of the motivations for outsourcing to private
providers was to save money-not spend more. Budget constraints would
affect government providers too, but here the mindset could arguably be
different. There was a public interest aspect to the crisis that could have
justified moving funds for one governmental project to another so as to
temporarily, at least, shore up welfare offices that were besieged. Under a
contract, however, a product was being sold and that product was, in reality,
a certain number of application reviews and decisions. It could not be
infinitely expandable. The private provider's profits would be adversely
affected if the demands greatly exceeded what the original contract was set
up to do. Profits would be lessened if the number of applications far
outpaced the numbers of employees hired to deal with these tasks. 153 In
theory, at least, and especially in emergency situations, the state might
have more flexibility when it comes to adding additional manpower on a
short-term basis than the private sector and the limits of the contracts
involved.154
149. Id. at 22.
150. See id. at 23.
151. Id. at 23-24.
152. The State and IBM mutually agreed to delay modernization efforts in order to
respond to the new work created by the recession and floods. See id. at 25.
153. This inflexibility and its possible effect on the profit margins of private contractors
was also seen in Pennsylvania, which outsourced the management of some of its halfway
houses-transitional residences for inmates on parole. The researcher who oversaw a
study of the halfway houses' effectiveness on former-inmates' recidivism rates noted that
the focus of the halfway houses "had been on filling up beds .. . [not] on producing
outcomes." Sam Dolnick, Pennsylvania Study Finds Halfway Houses Don't Reduce
Recidivism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2013, at A17. In the end, the privately-run halfway
house approach did not improve upon the publicly-run approach as far as recidivism was
concerned-the rates were the same. PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, RECIDIVISM
REPORT 33-36 (2013), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/
document/ 1324154/2013_padoc-recidivism-reportpdf.
154. See Michaels, supra note 51, at 631-40 (discussing the limits of the private sector
in providing public services). Professor Jon Michaels argues that corporations are
structured to act efficiently in order to maximize profits, which can create incentives to
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When the state decided to outsource welfare administration to a
consortium of companies, headed by IBM and ACS, these companies
were hired, in large part, to modernize the infrastructure used in the
processing welfare applications, with special attention given to reducing
the need for in-person counseling. The expectation was that human
error and corruption would decrease as a result of the move to the
automated system. Yet, in October of 2009, only three years into the
contract, Governor Daniels surprised many by cancelling the contract
with IBM, moving instead to a hybrid system and placing ACS at the
helm of the new project.155 In the months following, the state and IBM
litigated the decision to cancel, the state's ability to seize assets used by
the IBM group, and the alleged underperformance by IBM.156 These
issues are still being litigated today.
C. Implementation and Cancelation of the Contract
The IBM group began to assume control over the administration
of Indiana welfare claims in 2007.157 Despite gradually implementing
the program across the state to reduce strain on the new system, it
started off poorly even before the floods and economic meltdown
occurred. 158 Both IBM and ACS saw implementation problems from
the start. An IBM employee complained that ACS was understaffed,
while an ACS employee claimed that there were multiple applications
not in queue and duplicate scans of other applications appearing over
and over again. 15 9 In a 2007 e-mail, FSSA secretary Mitch Roob
described persistent problems such as thousands of lost work hours
and tens of thousands of unanswered calls. 160
Welfare recipients suffered as a result from these complications
during the implementation of this modernization program. The AARP of
Indiana complained that, "[t]oo many seniors, people with disabilities
underprovide services. Id. at 631-32. These incentives work at cross-purposes with
republican values, which support welfare as a necessity for civic participation. See
Michaels, supra note 33, at 1491-95 (2002).
155. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 36-37; Press
Release, State of Ind., State Ends Contract with IBM for Welfare Services (Oct. 15, 2009)
[hereinafter State Ends Contract], http://www.in.gov/portal/news-events/43261.htm.
156. See Dave Stafford, State Moves Forward with IBM Appeal, THE INDIANA LAWYER
(Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/state-moves-forward-with-ibm-
appealPARAMS/article/29507. The case is currently being litigated before the Indiana
Court of Appeals under cause number 49A05-1209-462.
157. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 20.
158. See id. at 20-21.
159. See id. at 20.
160. See id. at 20-21.
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and other of our most vulnerable citizens have endured monstrous
challenges to address their basic health care, nutritional and other daily
necessities."'16 1 In one such instance, an eighty-year-old woman's
Medicaid benefits were erroneously cut off. Her benefits were denied
because she failed to call into an eligibility hotline on a day because she
was hospitalized for congestive heart failure. 162 She was one of
thousands of Indiana residents to have their benefits, such as Medicaid
and food stamps, suddenly and erroneously cut off. 163 In 2009, Stacie
Kelly was twenty-seven weeks pregnant and did not have health
insurance. In order to see a doctor, she applied for Medicaid but did not
receive any response for two months despite calling her caseworker and
leaving numerous messages. 64
Brittany Anderson, who suffers from a seizure disorder, was told by
FSSA that she would have to reapply for Medicaid benefits in March of
2008.165 When her friend, Melissa Gibson, learned of the potential
termination, she called IBM several times to inquire about Brittany's
continued receipt of Medicaid benefits and received conflicting
responses from IBM representatives and no assistance. When Melissa
attempted to reapply for Medicaid benefits on behalf of Brittany, an
IBM employee told her that an application for Brittany had already
been received and a new one would not be accepted or processed. For the
next eight months, whenever Melissa would call to check on the status
of her friend's case, she was always told that the case was "pending."
Although Brittany and Melissa had signed releases allowing IBM access
to Brittany's medical records, IBM never contacted her medical
providers. When Brittany was without health coverage, a medical device
surgically implanted in her chest failed and she was unable to afford
corrective surgery. As a result, her health deteriorated after enduring
numerous seizures, and she was eventually forced to withdraw from
high school. It was only after Governor Daniels terminated the MSA
and Brittany's struggle was featured on local news that the FSSA
reinstated her Medicaid benefits. 166
161. Advocates for Seniors, Disabled Take Aim at IBM, THEINDYCHANNEL.COM (Sept.
25, 2009), http://www.theindychannel.com/news/advocates-for-seniors-disabled-take-aim-
at-ibm.
162. Matea Gold, Melanie Mason & Tom Hamburger, Indiana's Bumpy Road to
Privatization, L.A. TIMEs, (June 24, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jur
24/nationlla-na-indiana-privatize-20110624.
163. Id.
164. Pregnant Woman Frustrated by FSSA Slowness, THEINDYCHANNEL.COM (July 8,
2009), http://www.theindychannel.comlnews/pregnant-woman-frustrated-by-fssa-slowness.
165. See Gibson v. Int'l. Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 1:10-cv-00330-LJM-TAB, 2010 WL
3981792, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2010).
166. Id. at *2.
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Meanwhile, reports published by the state in 2008 and 2009
regarding the performance of the modernization initiative seemed to
indicate nothing but success in terms of the aggregate numbers
involved.167 In May 2008, Roob reported that "we are serving more
people statewide and in a timelier manner than we ever have before.1 6s
In 2009 it was reported that the agency was processing applications for
Medicaid, food stamps, and TANF benefits just as quickly as it was
before. 169 Allegations, however, then surfaced that IBM and ACS
workers prescreened applicants before state officials could determine
whether welfare benefits should have been given. As a 2011 Los Angeles
Times article stated, "documents were lost, [and when] cases piled up..
. workers started routinely denying applications just to reduce the
backlog."'1 70 Dozens of cases were filed in court alleging deprivation of
due process rights and negligence against the state and IBM. 17' Many
more complained to the FSSA and sought administrative remedies, 172
only to find litigation the only means of recourse. 173
167. See Indiana v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 26-
27 (Marion Super. Ct., Civ. Div. 10 July 18, 2012).
168. Id. at 26.
169. Id.
170. Gold, Mason & Hamburger, supra note 162.
171. See, e.g., Bowman v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 1:11-cv-0593 RLY-TAB, 2012 WL
5285919 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 23, 2012) (alleging deprivation of due process and negligence);
Bowman v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 766 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (claiming
deprivation of due process as Medicaid beneficiaries and bringing a claim for damages
under the contract between FSSA and IBM as third-party beneficiaries); Novak v. Ind.
Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., No. 1:10-cv-0677-RLY-DML, 2011 WL 1224813 (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 30, 2011) (seeking judicial review for denial of Medicaid benefits and damages for
IBM's negligent handling of the application and appeal of denial of Medicaid); Gibson,
2010 WL 3981792.
172. The modernization effort did not alter the right of welfare recipients to appeal a
determination for eligibility. IND. CODE § 12-15-28-1 (2012) (right to appeal Medicaid
determination); IND. CODE § 12-17.6-8-2 (2012) (right to appeal determination under the
Children's Health Insurance Program); IND. CODE § 12-10-17.1-21(3) (2012) (giving
authority to the division of aging to adopt appeals procedures); IND. CODE § 12-21-5-1.5(7)
(2012) (giving authority to the division of mental health and addiction to adopt appeals
procedures); 470 IND. ADMIN. CODE 10.3-11-1, -2 (2012) (right to appeal determination of
eligibility for TANF benefits); 470 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-4 (2012) (granting the right to
request a hearing and appeal before the division of family and children, which is the
division responsible for administering, among other programs, food stamps, and TANF
benefits). See generally IND. FAMILY & Soc. SERvs. ADMIN., HEARINGS AND APPEALS: YOUR
RIGHT TO APPEAL UNDER FOOD STAMPS (SNAP), TANF, REFUGEE CASH ASSISTANCE AND
MEDICAID/HOOSIER HEALTHWISE, http://www.in.gov/fssa/files/Hearings-andAppeals_-
_FSSA_1009.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
173. See, e.g., Murphy v. Terrell, 938 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (class action suit
brought against the state alleging deprivation of due process and that the class has a
constitutional right to an in-person administrative hearing). See also Perdue v. Murphy,
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FSSA officials suggested that they recognized the problems early in
the project, but "yielded to the company's wishes to expand the project"
to the remaining counties, thus qualifying for a greater payout from the
state.174 The expansion left the consortium exposed to the risks of
upswings in the number of claims, which is exactly what happened with
the 2007 floods and the 2008 financial recession.
Both the state and IBM were proactive in trying to adjust the
modernization plan to respond to the problems they encountered. The
contract was amended eleven times over the course of the project, which
added $178 million to the total cost, 1 75 and both parties conducted their
own extensive assessments of the project. 176  Beyond contract
amendments, IBM and the state made other adjustments along the way.
In November 2008, IBM met with FSSA to propose seventeen systemic
changes to adjust to the external problems it was facing, and the state
was able to implement many of these reforms. 177
But in early 2009, after the state began working on these reforms, it
sent a letter to the IBM Coalition outlining thirty-six issues that needed
to be addressed. 178 Many of these issues were identical to reforms
previously approved at the end of 2008.179 Notably, the letter outlined
twenty-one issues that were unrelated to existing performance
standards under the MSA and six more that were not yet in effect.'8 0 At
the same time, IBM also did an "end-to-end assessment" which
contained several recommendations for improvement, but nonetheless
concluded that "any problems on the Project were 'eminently fixable'
and that the concept of modernization was sound."'' 1 In July 2009, the
parties agreed on a "Corrective Action Plan," which included both
long- and short-term initiatives to address the issues that had been
raised in the state's letter and IBM's end-to-end assessment. 8 2 The
938 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), vacated sub nom. Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825
(Ind. 2012) (class action suit brought against the state alleging deprivation of due process
and that the modernized system has a disparate impact on persons with disabilities).
174. Ken Kusmer, Indiana: IBM Welfare Intake Work Flawed from Start, BOSTON.COM
(July 21, 2010), http://www.boston.comlbusiness/articles/2O1O/O7/21/indiana ibm-welfare_
intake_work_flawed_from_start.
175. Indiana v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 27
(Marion Super. Ct., Civ. Div. 10 July 18, 2012).
176. See id. at 27, 29.
177. See id. at 28-29.
178. See id. By this time Anne Murphy had replaced Mitch Roob as Secretary of FSSA.
Roob had been appointed by Governor Daniels to be the head of the Department of
Commerce. Id. at 28.
179. Id. at 29.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id.
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adjustments seemed to reflect good-faith efforts by both parties to work
together to improve the project. But eventually, the state realized that
adjustments were not enough; an entirely new approach was needed.
Just two months after signing the Corrective Action Plan, the state
decided to move to a modified approach, "Plan B," which abandoned the
centralized call center, decentralized eligibility case management, and
utilized face-to-face interactions with FSSA staff.'8 3 But rather than
directly approach IBM about modifying the original plans for complete
modernization, the state approached long-time state welfare officials to
come up with a different approach. 8 4 The main concern was that the
original plan had used too much technology, too quickly. 8 5 With a new
approach in hand, the state then decided to pursue IBM about changing
course.'8 6 Governor Daniels announced that the decision had nothing to
do with the performance of IBM and it appears that the state hoped that
IBM would implement the hybrid plan. 8 7 IBM initially expressed
willingness to move forward with Plan B, but eventually concluded that
it could not implement the hybrid system without an increase in the
contract price that the state could not afford due to budget cuts.188
Finally, in October 2009, Governor Daniels, spurred on by
increasing pressure from public interest groups, 89 state Democrats, 190
and the Federal Department of Agriculture,' 9' canceled the contract
with IBM,192 despite noting that "[t]he fraud appears to have been
stopped and we're still on track to save taxpayers hundreds of millions
of dollars" through the new, hybrid system.1 93 The governor conceded
183. Id. at 31-32.
184. Id. at 33.
185. See id. Governor Daniels stated, "it is the concept of the system" that is the
problem. Id. Furthermore, a state internal e-mail stated the following: "It was a process
problem. We just went to technology too fast and will be implementing more face to face to
solve the problem." Id. at 33 n. 52.
186. Id. at 33.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 34-35.
189. See Mannix, LaCheen, Freedman & Cohan, supra note 141, at 9-10; Jim Wallihan,
Welfare Privatization: Back to the Drawing Board?, 29 THE UNITED SENIOR ADVOCATE, no.
1, 2010, at 10, available at http://www.usaindiana.org/Advocate%20&%2OBriefs/
10.winterAdvocate.pdf; The Privatization of Indiana's Family and Social Services Agency,
Citizens Action Coalition Education Fund, http://cacefindiana.orgnode/programs
health_care/privatization fssa (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
190. See Herrell Glad FSSA Recognizes Problems in Privatization,
KOKOMOPERSPECTIVE.COM (Aug. 15, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://kokomoperspective.com/news/
new-herrell-glad-fssa-recognizes-problems-in-privatizationarticle_5a7353f6-2455-5539-
b48b-95ca6f69dcaa.html#user-comment-area.
191. See Mannix, LaCheen, Freedman & Cohan, supra note 141, at 9.
192. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 36.
193. State Ends Contract, supra note 155.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:1
that "the intended service improvements have not been delivered, and
that's not acceptable."' 194 In its place, the governor tapped ACS to
oversee a hybrid system that would incorporate successful elements of
the old welfare system and what is known as the modernized system. 195
In short, Governor Daniels canceled the contract for a lack of progress
made by IBM, and he criticized the program for two primary reasons:
"[t]he system tried to remove the burden of required face-to-face
meetings and it used a task-based approach rather than a case-based
approach to process applications. 1 96 In addition to removing IBM from
the Project, the government seized "more than $9 million worth of
[IBM's] computers, servers and office furniture" that the company used
while in charge. 197
In response, IBM called the cancelation "unjustified" and added that
"[o]ur efforts have significantly improved the Indiana welfare system to
the benefit of recipients and all of the state."1 98 The company noted that
it was making sufficient progress-contrary to Governor Daniel's
claim-but that "high unemployment led to more demands on the
welfare system, making the changes more difficult."199 IBM asserted
breach of contract among other claims. It also filed a separate suit
against the state, and its claims were consolidated with the state's
originally-filed complaint. 200
In the opening lines of the court opinion, Judge Dreyer of the
Marion Superior Court stated that "[n]either party deserves to win this
case. This story represents a 'perfect storm' of misguided government
policy and overzealous corporate ambition. Overall, both parties are to
194. Id.
195. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 33, 37. Under the
MSA, ASC was initially the subcontractor working for IBM. Id. at 30.
196. State Ends Contract, supra note 155.
197. Kusmer, supra note 174.
198. Indiana Cancels $1.3 Billion Welfare Privatization Contract,
THEINDYcHANNEL.COM (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.theindychannel.com/news/indiana-
cancels- 1-3-billion-welfare-privatization-contract.
199. Ken Kusmer, Ind. Governor Cancels Troubled $1.3 Billion Welfare Privatization
Contract With IBM, STARTRIBUNE.COM (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.startribune.com/
templates/PrintThisStorysid=64434927.
200. State v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ind. 2012). In the midst of
discovery, the sides produced lists of requested deponents and in-court witnesses; on
IBM's list was Governor Mitch Daniels. The state moved to prevent the Governor's
testimony, citing Indiana Code section 34-29-2-1-providing the Governor of the state of
Indiana is "privileged from arrest on civil process, and from obeying any subpoena to
testify." Id. IBM claimed that Daniels's testimony was relevant and central to its claim.
The trial court granted IBM's motion, with limitations and the state requested an
interlocutory appeal on the issue. Id. at 209. The Indiana Supreme Court agreed to hear
the appeal and ultimately ruled that "[tihe privilege afforded by [the] Indiana Code
section ... is absolute" and remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at 209, 212.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE
blame and Indiana's taxpayers are left as apparent losers."20 1 The court
found that Indiana had failed to prove that IBM breached its contract,
and awarded no damages to the state. The court ordered the state to pay
a total of $52 million plus interest and fees to IBM, $40 million from a
previous order, plus a new $12 million judgment which predominately
covers equipment kept by the state. 20 2 Despite these complications and
legal woes, Governor Daniels proclaimed that cancelling the contract
had been the right action because "now [Indiana] has its most timely,
most accurate, most cost effective and fraud free system."20 3 This, he
stated, was always the goal and severing ties with IBM was necessary
to achieve it.204
III. LESSONS LEARNED: RE-EMBEDDING MARKET APPROACHES INTO
SOCIETY
At this juncture, we may make several observations about the case
just presented. First, Indiana's process of renewing the search for a
hybrid approach in some ways confirms the double movement effect
predicted by Polanyi, mainly in the disembedding story and its reversal
through the political process. 205 At the same time, Polanyi might not
have anticipated that the key actor in the re-embedding process was the
Governor, prompted and supported by the legislature. Second, as the
limits of a marketized approach became apparent, political pressures to
rectify the situation grew, but this did not mean returning to the old
regime. Third, re-embedding introduced new requirements-specifically
to preserve the conditions' flexibility and innovation associated with the
private sector, while also fulfilling the rights of welfare recipients in
ways associated with the public sector. I develop these observations
further below. What can we learn from this process? Specifically, what
role might law play to ensure the optimum conditions of an effective
double movement?
201. Indiana v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 1
(Marion Super. Ct., Civ. Div. 10 July 18, 2012).
202. Id. at 3.
203. Gov. Mitch Daniels' Response to Ruling in IBM Case, INDYSTAR.COM (July 19,
2012), http://www.indystar.com/article/20120718/NEWS05/207190315/Gov-Mitch-Daniels-
response-ruling-IBM-case.
204. Id.
205. POLANYI, supra note 3, at 79-80.
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A. Law Reform: Creating Opportunities for Contest and Contestation
The essence of the double movement is that when the separation of
the market from the state goes too far, a politics will develop that
demands a return. In this case, we see that alternatives to market
approaches emerged when their selective impact on citizens (including
costs imposed on them) was deemed unacceptable. 206 More generally,
resistance to marketization through the political process entails both
communication and accountability between the state and private
citizens. Though vulnerable populations such as welfare recipients are
not as likely to push back politically speaking as more privileged groups
in society, this makes law reforms designed to re-embed market
processes in the state all the more important. At a minimum, law
reforms can help ensure that there is a free flow of information about
proposed privatization plans and the goals sought to be achieved, as
well as an opportunity to comment on these proposals in a timely and
meaningful way.
As the Indiana case set forth above shows, such law reforms can
help trigger the double movement and channel it effectively-for
example, by assuring that innovative market approaches are
re-embedded in the state in a way that meets both the substantive goals
of the statute and efficiency concerns. Perhaps the most important
reform is the realization that the kinds of activities being outsourced in
the social services sector are not the same as the building of roads or
bridges. Yet the procurement processes employed in this case were those
most commonly used for public works projects, with, in this case, an
important addition as well. The decision to add a new level of contract
review added by the Governor after the bidding process was complete
implicitly recognized that this type of contract required greater scrutiny
to ensure the state's goals were achieved-it was more complicated than
the typical public works or service contract. In the Indiana case,
Governor Daniels' decision to appoint a committee of six agency heads to
review the contracting process and provisions before signing with IBM
was, to some extent, effectively institutionalized by a statute passed in
2007.207 Passed as an appropriations rider, the statute requires that
large contracts that privatize services traditionally performed by stage
agency employees now must be subject to comment by the public and by
the state budget committee. 208 The public hearing must occur at least
206. Id.
207. See Act effective July 1, 2007, 2007 Ind. Legis. Serv. Pub. L. No. 234-2007, § 224
(West) (codified at IND. CODE § 4-12-13 (2008)).
208. Although Florida has succeeded in modernizing its welfare system, it did so
without privatization. See Act effective July 1, 2005, ch. 2005-61, § 6, 2005 Fla. Laws ch.
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thirty days prior entering the agreement. 209 And although the statute
gives the state budget committee the opportunity to make a
recommendation concerning the contract thirty days before its enacted,
the statute does not require a recommendation. 210 The statute aims
more at making the procurement process more transparent rather than
creating a substantial hurdle to that process. Moreover, because the
opportunity for a public hearing takes place later in the process, there is
no opportunity for a public discussion of whether the state should
consider privatizing government service in the first place.
There are many reasons why a more elaborate contracting review
process is necessary when the duties being outsourced involve welfare.
The human dimensions of the product being contracted for are far more
complex than the brick and mortar nature of a bridge or a road.
Moreover, bidding processes set forth in procurement statutes are
concerned primarily with eliminating corruption of a certain kind-
where favoritism is shown to political supporters or the like. 211 This
kind of corruption, as we have seen, was a factor motivating Indiana's
welfare reforms, among others, but it is not truly central to the kind of
process needed to craft a new welfare benefits delivery system that
2005-61, 6 (repealing Act effective July 1, 2004, ch. 2004-267, § 114, 2004 Fla. Laws ch.
2004-267, 123.) See also Mannix, LaCheen, Freedman & Cohan, supra note 141, at 10.
This is another approach that Indiana could have considered-modernizing the system
while refusing to outsource operation and management. The Federal Government has also
considered partially foreclosing privatization of welfare services in the food stamp context.
In 2007, the House of Representatives enacted a bill that would have mandated that only
state employees determine eligibility under the food stamp act and interact with food
stamp recipients. See H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 4015(a)(2)(B) (1st Sess. 2007) ((amending 7
U.S.C. § 2020(e)(6)). However, this mandate did not make it into the final legislation
approved by both houses. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
234, §§ 4119-20, 122 Stat. 923 (2008).
209. IND. CODE § 4-12-13-2(b)(1) (2012). The statute also requires this process if the
state wants to have state employees directly provide government services that had
formerly been provided by a private vendor-essentially, this changes state policy by
moving away from privatized services and reinstating government employees. IND. CODE §
4-12-13-3(a) (2012). However, the statute allows for an agency director to expedite this
process if he or she declares "that an emergency exists that requires the employees of the
state agency to directly provide the services that were provided by a private contractor or
private vendor." IND. CODE § 4-12-13-3(b) (2012). Interestingly enough, this emergency
provision was passed in 2007, well before the state terminated its contract with IBM in
2010.
210. IND. CODE § 4-12-13-2(b)(2).
211. Daniel I. Gordon, Anti-Corruption Internationally: Challenges In Procurement
Markets Abroad-Part II: The Path Forward for Using Procurement Law to Help with
Development and the Fight Against Corruption, WEST GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS YEAR IN
REVIEW CONFERENCE COVERING 2012 1 (2013), available at
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1329&context=faculty-public
ations.
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achieves its substantive goals, including delivering benefits to the
needy. To this end, what is essential is the participation of a wide range
of stakeholders and citizens, including the most obvious of the
stakeholders involved, the welfare applicants themselves.
More importantly, the state itself has interests broader than just
lowering the cost of welfare administration when it makes contracts
such as these-it also has responsibility for the actual welfare of the
applicants involved. The state is the true client in this bargain and it
must be sure to write a contract comprehensive enough to ensure these
responsibilities are appropriately delegated to the private provider
involved so that it can be responsive, not only to taxpayers in general,
but to welfare applicants and recipients in particular. The scope of this
statutory reform should be expanded. The basic decision to outsource a
governmental program is, in and of itself, a significant one and
procedural opportunities to question the wisdom of that basic decision
should also be provided in a timely way, quite apart from an analysis of
the details of the actual outsourcing contract involved. The Indiana
statute authorizing a hearing thirty days prior to enactment is a good
start at re-embedding markets into the state, but the law should provide
for comment much earlier than thirty days before implementation. More
specifically, it should enable a discussion of what should be done
privately and what should be done in-house before that basic decision
becomes a fait accompli.
In addition to holding a public hearing and soliciting a
recommendation from the state budget committee, the contract should
also be published on a government website212 before enactment so that
affected stakeholders and their public interest representatives can
comment on its specific provisions. 213 In the Indiana case, there would
undoubtedly have been even more significant feedback on the computer
literacy of the potential beneficiaries that made up most of the potential
welfare recipients, as well as the counter arguments for retaining a
substantial face-to-face component of the welfare processes then in
place. In fact, the state actually sought such feedback informally while
it was implementing its hybrid plan. FSSA issued a press release
212. The Internet did play a major role in the informal response and criticism of the
IBM contract. See Mannix, LaCheen, Freedman & Cohan, supra note 141, at 9-10.
Several websites were created that allowed individuals adversely affected by the
modernization project to log their complaints and stories. See, e.g., The Privatization of
Indiana's Family and Social Services Agency, supra note 189.
213. Governor Daniels, by executive order, already requires that government contracts
be posted on the Internet in a searchable database. See Governor of Indiana, Exec. Order
No. 05-07 (Jan. 10, 2005); Ind. Dep't of Admin., Executive Document Summary, IN.GOV,
http://www.in.gov/idoa/2525.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) [hereinafter IDOA, Executive
Document Summary].
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seeking comments and recommendations from anyone familiar with the
old casework system.214 This should now be institutionalized more
formally in a notice and comment statutory provision.
Such an expanded contracting approach would produce a better
contract that increases participation and feedback for decision makers.
The agency involved would have a better and more timely sense of what
might work and what might fail. At the same time, knowledge of the
contract involved would give potential beneficiaries of.these reforms an
opportunity to suggest alternative ways of achieving a more efficient
system that effectively carries out its substantive goals.
B. Third-Party Beneficiaries
Quite apart from the processes utilized to create these contracts and
the opportunities they provide for various stakeholders, especially
potential and actual welfare recipients, to participate, welfare recipients
should be treated as third-party beneficiaries of the contract being
formulated. What the Indiana case shows in stark relief is that the state
was the client in this contract. Further, at least at the outset, access to
welfare (and therefore welfare recipients themselves) represented the
product for which the state contracted. However, the complexities of this
arrangement, including the important differences that existed among
the types and needs of the welfare recipients involved, ultimately
required more complex processes to determine eligibility, processes that
combined new technologies with face-to-face contact as well. It did not
make sense to assume certain uniform levels of computer literacy or
even access to call centers.
Though welfare applicants and recipients were at times referred to
as clients, their rights were represented exclusively by the state. The
essence of the Polanyi double movement is that the impetus for
re-embedding the state into the market is most likely to come from
those most affected-the potential welfare recipients themselves. To
this end, providing them with an opportunity for judicial review makes
the double movement even more likely to occur. Contracts between
private companies and states could recognize welfare recipients as
third-party beneficiaries to the contract to allow recipients legal redress
214. Press Release, Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., FSSA Seeks Input on Hybrid
System (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/
EventList.aspx?fromdate= 11/5/2009&todate= 11/5/2009&display=Day&type=public&event
idn=7191&view=EventDetails&information-id=14399.
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when private contractors violate the terms of the contract in a way that
results in the unlawful deprivation of benefits.215
Indiana law recognizes third-party beneficiaries when (1) the
parties to the contract intend to benefit a third party, (2) the contract
imposes a duty on one of the parties in favor of the third party, and (3)
the performance of the terms of the contract directly benefits the third
party.216 However, courts will not interpret a contract so as to render
any clauses, phrases, or words in a contract meaningless. Therefore,
contracts that include "no third-beneficiary clauses" unambiguously
state the parties' intent to not create third-party beneficiaries. 217 The
MSA discussed above had such a clause.218 The Indiana legislature
could therefore enact legislation that would make the state's agreement
to such a clause in a contract with vendors for the privatization of
government services a violation of public policy. Moreover, the
legislature could also require language in the contract explicitly making
welfare recipients third-party beneficiaries.
It is ironic that the only party that was able to challenge IBM's
performance was the state. Given the diverse interests at stake and the
state's desire to have its contract work as efficiently as possible, it might
not be as willing to challenge the contractor as those whose benefits are
very much on the line. At a minimum, making the proposed contract
more available publicly before it is signed would enable potential
welfare recipients to determine whether a third-party beneficiary clause
in fact exists in the contract, giving them the chance to advocate for this
means of holding IBM accountable to its promises.
215. Welfare recipients would enjoy third-party beneficiary status alongside their
existing rights to appeal welfare determinations under existing law. See supra note 173.
216. Bowman v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 766, 769 (S.D. Ind. 2012). The
relevant language in the contract stated:
No Third-Party Beneficiaries. Other than the indemnity rights under
Article 17, (1) nothing contained in this Agreement is intended or shall
be construed to confer upon any person or entity (other than the
Parties hereto) any rights, benefits or remedies of any kind or
character whatsoever, and (ii) no person or entity shall be deemed a
third-party beneficiary under or by reason of this Agreement.
Id. at 769-70 (emphasis omitted) (citing MSA § 21.6).
217. In Bowman, the Southern District of Indiana determined that welfare recipients
(specifically, Medicaid recipients) were not third-party beneficiaries to the MSA in order to
avoid rendering the "No Third-Party Beneficiaries" clause ineffective or meaningless. Id.
at 771-72.
218. See id. at 769-70.
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C. Information
Additional regulation involving potential contractors in social
services contracts of this sort should also be considered. 219 In general,
the records of private corporations are not subject to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).220 Likewise, in Indiana, private corporations
that provide a fee-for-service for the state are not subject to the Indiana
Access to Public Records Act (APRA).221 However, states such as
Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, and Vermont, have started initiatives to
promote corporate transparency by requiring contractors to disclose all
subcontractors which they will directly contract with on each project,
and to require that the information be posted on the Internet.222 Other
states, like Connecticut, go further and require that all contractors
performing a government function normally performed by a state
agency ensure that that state agency receive all copies of documents
related to the performance of that government function and that all
documents be subject to disclosure under FOIA.223 In other words,
disclosure is now inextricably linked to the performance of a
government function. 224
219. Cf. Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and
Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 111, 113 (2005) ("Today, it is easier to see
that arguments for or against privatization are actually about accountability.").
220. See U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (holding that an
"agency record" under the FOIA must first, be created or obtained by the agency, and
second, must be under the control of the agency at the time the FOIA request was made).
221. IND. CODE § 5-14-3-2.1 (2012). Indiana's version of the Freedom of Information Act,
the APRA can be found at § 5-14-3-1 through -10 (2012). The statute defines "public
record" as:
any writing, paper, report, study, map, photograph, book, card, tape
recording, or other material that is created, received, retained,
maintained, or filed by or with a public agency and which is generated
on paper, paper substitutes, photographic media, chemically based
media, magnetic or machine readable media, electronically stored
data, or any other material, regardless of form or characteristics.
§ 5-14-3-2(n). See generally Eric J. Graninger, Indiana Opens Public Records: But (b)(6)
May Be the Exemption That Swallows the Rule, 17 IND. L. REV. 555 (1984).
222. See S.B. 36, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2010), available at
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/searchableinstruments/2010rs/bills/sb36.htm;
H.B. 2325, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/
legtextJ49leg/2r/bills/hb2325p.pdf; S.B. 2868, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2010), available
at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session20O/bills/SB2868-.pdf; H.R. 748, 2009-2010 Leg.
Sess. (Vt. 2010), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/bills/Intro/H-748.pdf.
223. See Act of July 6, 2001, § 2, 2001 Conn. Acts. 01-169 (Reg. Sess.). See generally
Greg Bass & Harry Hammitt, Freedom of Information Act Access to Documents of Private
Contractors Doing the Public's Business, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 607 (2002).
224. Bass & Hammitt, supra note 223, at 612.
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Shortly after he was elected in 2004, Governor Daniels issued an
executive order requiring that the Department of Administration log
and summarize, on the Internet, "the significant terms and conditions
and other key elements of all written contracts to which the State
becomes a party."225 This online index is searchable and free of charge to
the public. 226 This index does not include agreements between
government contractors and subcontractors, and the Indiana APRA227
does not explicitly mandate public disclosure of subcontracts. But it does
not explicitly exempt them either.228 Moreover, in the MSA between
IBM and the state, the parties agreed that all information in the
possession of the state was subject to an APRA request unless the
contractor had formally designated the information "confidential."229
The fact that the state negotiated this kind of language suggests that it
understands the APRA to mean that agreements between contractors
and subcontractors in possession of the state would be subject to an
APRA request as long as the vendor did not formally designate them as
"confidential."230 Indiana could, nevertheless, be more explicit about the
right of welfare recipients and other interested parties to request
information from the state concerning privatization efforts.
CONCLUSION
Polanyi's analysis of double movement is useful for considering the
limits of the market in relation to specific substantive programs. In the
welfare case study presented above, the government ultimately
remained in control of the programs involved, but it sought to substitute
private providers where it had formerly administered programs through
a diverse concatenation of state and county offices. In the context of
welfare, then, states became clients as new best business practices
substituted for traditional government case work. In Polanyi's terms we
can assess the extent to which marketization of the administration of
welfare disembeds the market from the state only to return key services
225. Governor of Indiana, Exec. Order No. 05-07 (Jan. 10, 2005).
226. Id. See IDOA, Executive Document Summary, supra note 213.
227. See IND. CODE § 5-14-3-1 to -10 (2012).
228. See id.
229. See MSA § 9.11.1, .2 (on file with the author).
230. Moreover, in the transportation context, the Indiana Department of Transportation
(INDOT) prohibits general contractors from subcontracting work in excess of $100,000
without its approval. The agency has to subject the subcontractor to a prequalification
process, which involves certain required disclosures to the agency. See 105 IND. ADMIN.
CODE 11-2-10 (2012). The information submitted to the agency prior to approval would
likely be exempt from the ARPA under the state's deliberative process privilege, see IND.
CODE § 5-14-3-4(b)(6) (2012), but the final contract would probably be publicly available.
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to the state after a perceived failure of the contract on the part of the
private provider. The example suggests we may look forward to new
relationships between public and private entities that in turn suggest
new uses of law and the need for new law reforms.
Understanding how different conceptions of globalization yield
different approaches to providing for and conceptualizing social
services-analyzing, in other words, some of the domestic faces of
globalization-gives us a chance to think practically and conceptually
about the law's role, especially if law is to be a means by which we can
rethink the relationship of economy and society for vulnerable
populations. Indiana's efforts to modernize welfare were initially
consistent with an ideological version of neoliberalism that relied
heavily on markets as substitutes for traditional governmental
provision of services. Yet the double movement predicted by Polanyi
occurred. The political process pushed back and the complaints of many
potential and actual welfare recipients ultimately seemed to register.
Faced with challenges, the strict binary choice between government and
the market inherent in that ideology gave way to a more hybrid (and
more realistic) approach-a new mix of market streamlining and
face-to-face encounters with welfare recipients. New relationships
between private providers of services, the government and the potential
beneficiaries of this public-private partnership, were formed, even as
the limits of the marketization of welfare administration in Indiana
were reached. Those limits included a misreading of the needs of
welfare recipients as if they were like any set of potential customers.
The new system that emerged out of the lawsuit leaves more room for
judgment and discretion. A binary approach (dividing best business
practices from government) simply could not provide the basis for
resolving the toughest issues. Indeed, when the numbers of welfare
claims rose dramatically due to floods and an economic crisis, IBM could
not simply add more people to its payroll and efficiently absorb all of
these new costs. There were limits to what a for-profit corporation was
able to do to carry out a contract at a certain cost. 231 Its stockholders
implicitly imposed those limits. After the contract dispute and the
breach of contract suit, a hybrid approach emerged-hybrid, not only in
the methodology for assessing eligibility claims, but hybrid also in the
sense that it was now recognized that private corporate efficiency alone
231. See supra text accompanying note 175 (noting the fact that changes to the MSA
resulted in $178 million in additional cost for the state).
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could not absorb the additional costs of the economic and natural crises
that took place. 23 2
When market approaches are proposed for the administration of
social services and applied to vulnerable populations that by definition
usually lack significant political power, law should provide the means
for keeping markets connected to the state. Allowing for greater public
participation in the contracting process and providing the information
necessary to make such participation effective would be an important
reform. As Polanyi argued, there has never been a self-regulating
market, but this does not mean the idea of self-regulation is
unimportant or without high stakes.233 Law is necessary not only to
ensure that property rights exist and contracts are enforced, but it is
also necessary to connect the market and the state in ways that increase
efficiency without undermining what should be the main goal of any
welfare program: the actual welfare of the people it is meant to serve.
232. See supra text accompanying note 214 (noting the fact that IBM was ultimately
unable to implement the "Tlan B" hybrid approach because the state could not afford to
pay the additional costs that such a switch would require).
233. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Foreword to POLANYI, supra note 3, at xiii.
